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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the effectiveness and legality of San
Francisco's Office/Housing Production Program (OHPP), which
links office and residential development. Reasoning that new
office buildings attract new residents to the city, San
Francisco now requires office developers to build, sponsor,
rehabilitate or finance housing in order to receive permission
to build offices.
The city developed the program in response to a severe
housing shortage, a prosperous office market, cutbacks in
federal housing funds and a heavily-regulated planning
environment. The planning department calculates each office
developer's housing requirement under a formula, which relates
office space to housing demand and which encourages, but does
not require, production of low- and moderate-income housing.
To date, OHPP has succeeded both economically, insofar as it
has apparently increased housing production in the city
(although not all the OHPP units are necessarily net adds to
the housing stock), and politically, insofar as the program
alone has neither provoked a major development exodus nor
created litigation.
In imposing OHPP, the city has chosen not to enact an OHPP
ordinance but to instead rely on the planning commission's
discretionary review power as authorization for the program.
Analysis suggests, however, that an OHPP ordinance, sanctioned
by the Board of Supervisors, would both improve the legal
underpinnings of the program and decrease the possibility of
political manipulation. The constitutional validity of the
program merely requires that housing production be found to
serve a legitimate state interest and that an increase in
office space be related to an increase in housing demand. The
city can and should require production of low- and
moderate-income housing, although the provision of any kind of
housing would probably be legally acceptable as long as the
success of filtering is fairly debatable. If the cost of
participation in OHPP is related to, but not greater than, the
investment necessary to generate a housing unit, then
Proposition 13's prohibition against special taxes will not
prove an obstacle to the imposition of the program.
Although the program meets the letter of the law, San
Francisco should mandate particpation only as long as
developers continue to flock to the city. Moreover, the city
should assume a broader coordinating role to ensure that the
housing produced meets the city's needs.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lawrence S. Bacow
Associate Professor of Law and Environmental Policy
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THE OFFICE-HOUSING LINK:
SOCIAL POLICY UNDERWRITTEN BY PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
The demand for housing is unrelenting. Vacancies
are all but non-existent. The prices of
condominiums and houses soar. Rents are the
highest in history. Over 2000 households enter
the City each year, but annually less than 1000
new housing units are built . . . . This is
intolerable. Yet, the federal budget cutters,
instead of confronting the housing crisis here
and throughout the United States, merely
aggravate it by the ruthless elimination of vital
housing programs . . . . We will not turn our
back on the housing crisis. With resilience and
resourcefulness, and a determined self-reliance,
we must develop a comprehensive housing program
of our own -- to build where possible, to
subsidize where practical, to encourage
rehabilitation.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country, high interest rates, large
cutbacks in federal housing funds, and an increase in the
number of households have helped to create a housing
shortage, especially for families of low- and
moderate-income.2 Unable to control interest rates or
the federal budget, city officials are searching for
innovative solutions that will ameliorate the housing
problem in their own jurisdictions.
As part of its regulatory approach to solving the
housing shortage, particularly for low- and
moderate-income families, San Francisco has devised a
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program that capitalizes on its relatively prosperous
office economy. As a prerequisite to planning permission,
downtown office developers must mitigate their impact on
the housing market; reasoning that new office buildings
attract new residents to the city, the city now requires
office developers to build, rehabilitate, sponsor or fund
housing in order to receive planning permission for office
development. The number of housing units for which an
office developer is responsible depends on the number of
square feet in the office building. This "Office Housing
Production Program" (OHPP) is currently being administered
by the City Planning Department and the Mayor's Office of
Housing and Community Development (OHCD) and has not yet
been enacted by ordinance. Implementation of the program
has sparked heated debate in the development community,
causing the city to proceed cautiously in selecting the
appropriate legal form of the program.
Toronto, Canada, London, England, 4 and Denver,
Colorado 5 have implemented incentive programs that link
offices and housing, while Santa Monica, California6 has
attempted to institute a more all-inclusive system for
linking land use functions. San Francisco's program is
unique, however, in its exclusive focus on the
office-housing link and the mandatory nature of the
housing contribution requirement. This controversial
- 4 -
7program has drawn inquiries from a number of cities, as
other localities consider whether they can or should solve
housing problems by shifting some of the burden to office
developers.
This article explores the effectiveness and legality
of OHPP, suggesting changes both to help the program meet
its stated goals and to reinforce its legality. More
specifically, the article discusses the rationale for
requiring office developers to contribute to housing, the
extent to which the program meets its objectives, and
legal arguments which both challenge and support the
program. Finally, the article proposes modifications in
the structure of the program, the most important of which
include restricting the use of OHPP housing contributions
to the production of housing aimed at residents of low-
and moderate-incomes, enabling the city both to better
coordinate the contributions of office developers and the
housing needs of the city and to adapt the requirement to
changes in the office and housing markets, and, perhaps
the most pressing need, codifying the program in an
ordinance.
II. HISTORY AND RATIONALE
A. Context of the Program
OHPP was first proposed by housing activists in 1980,
and was implemented by the city planning commission later
that year.8 The program, a response to the city's
- 5 -
severe housing crisis, was shaped by a variety of factors
affecting the San Francisco housing market; these factors
include the effects of cutbacks in federal funding for
housing, a booming office market, and a regulatory
planning environment.
1. Severe Housing Shortage
The housing shortage in San Francisco is characterized
by an imbalance between supply and demand generally, and
particularly between the cost of housing and the incomes
of housing consumers.9 The average buyer cannot afford
monthly mortgage payments at current high interest rates;
therefore housing developers are holding back
construction.10 For example, there were 1402 "net adds"
(additions minus demolitions) to the housing stock in
1979, but only 852 in 1980.11 While the rate of supply
is decreasing, however, demand for housing is on the
upswing. The most noticeable trend is an increase in the
number of young professionals, who have a high demand for
city center housing;l2 the population in the 25-44 age
bracket is increasing,13 the number of households is
rising, and employment in the professional,
managerial, and service sectors is growing.15 This
imbalance between supply and demand results in high prices
and rents;1 6 the imposition of condominium conversion
restrictions and rent control laws in response to this
situation17 has not proven to be an adequate solution.
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Another, related aspect of the housing crisis in San
Francisco is that the housing that is being produced
caters almost exclusively to those in upper-income
brackets, since they alone can afford the current mortgage
interest rates.18 The private housing market is not
meeting the needs of the low- and moderate-wage
earners. 9 While studies of the housing situation in
San Francisco disagree as to whether the primary need for
housing is for very low-income households20 or for
middle class two-income households 21, they do agree that
more luxury housing is not a high priority and that those
earning less than the median income are hardest hit by the
housing shortage. 2 2
2. Large Federal Cutbacks
Reduced spending for public sector housing programs is
one factor that has helped to make the housing crisis
particularly severe for low- and moderate-income
households. In 1981 and 1982 the federal government
drastically reduced funding for the housing program budget
of the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development;23 San Francisco consequently was forced to
cut back its plans for federally funded new and
rehabilitated housing. 2 4
- 7 -
3. Commercial Boom
In contrast with its housing market, San Francisco's
commercial market has been relatively successful in
withstanding the recession. 25 Office buildings are a
driving force in the economy of the city: San Francisco
is a major financial center and headquarters city, serving
international business26 and providing jobs in services,
finance, insurance, real estate, transportation, utilities
communications and wholesale trade. 2 7
The office market boomed in 1980 and 1981. The office
vacancy rate was very low, at 0.1%;28 the national
average of office vacancy rates ranged from about 3.5% to
4.8% during this period.29 Gross rents in the tight
downtown market were very high, typically $24-35 per
square foot, with projections that rents would increase to
$35-45 per square foot in 1982.30 Moreover, in December
of 1981, it was estimated that over 12,000,000 square feet
of new downtown office space, attracting 46,000 new
employees would be built over the next five years. 3 1
The average annual increase in downtown office space
during the past few years has been approximately 1.5
million square feet. 3 2
The office market did soften somewhat in 1982 as a
result of the recession, the increasing tendency of firms
to move data processing operations to the suburbs, 3 3 and
the fact that demand was partially satisfied by the new
wave of downtown office construction.3 4 The vacancy
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factor rose from .01% to 3.6%, with projections that it
would stabilize at 6-7% by the end of 1983.35 Even this
higher vacancy rate, however, was low by national
standards: between March and September of 1982, the
nationwide average office vacancy rate rose from 5.6% to
9%.36
4. Regulatory Planning Environment
Throughout California there is an increasing tendency
to use land use regulations to exert planning control. 3 7
Revisions to the new state housing law,38 for example,
contain detailed provisions that govern the contents of
the housing element of local general plans.39 The new
provisions require that cities identify and provide for
their fair share of the regional housing need,40 and
make plans to assist in the development of adequate
housing for households of low- to moderate-income.4 1
The legislation envisions that the local governments will
form new partnerships with the private sector to implement
these housing requirements.4 2
Reflecting the statewide tendency, San Francisco has
relied on regulation to respond to local antigrowth
43initiatives and to implement planning goals. The city
has imposed a growing number of development restrictions
on a business community which, until recently, has
responded to rather than initiated proposals for
mitigating development impacts. 4 These city
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regulations range from the imposition of rent control 4 5
and requirements for condominium and residential hotel
conversions46 to plans for a transit impact development
fee. 4 7 The city is currently formulating an overall
strategy to guide downtown development.48 Although
developers assert that the large number of restrictive
planning regulations and the slowness of the permit
process make it difficult to function in San Francisco,
there has been no widespread rebellion against the
imposition of the restrictions. 4 9
B. Alternative Solutions
San Francisco could theoretically have chosen a number
of conceptually different ways to (1) reduce the
supply-demand housing imbalance, (2) increase the
affordability of housing, (3) find a substitute source of
money to replace dwindling federal grants, and (4) fulfill
the state housing requirements.
First, the city could have chosen to socialize the
housing burden by forcing people to pay according to their
ability. A city wanting to implement such a collectivist
solution could theoretically raise property taxes or levy
a local income tax. As discussed below, taxpayer
intolerance with further tax increases expressed by the
passage of Proposition 13 makes this solution politically
infeasible in San Francisco.
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Second, the city could have chosen to adopt a regional
solution by shifting the housing burden to the suburbs.
This approach is foreclosed, however, by Cal. Gov't Code
S 65583 which requires that each city provide for its fair
share of the regional housing need. Moreover, housing
downtown workers in the suburbs would increase traffic
congestion and air pollution and cause a regional
transportation shortfall.
Third, the planning department could have chosen to
discourage office growth in the city. Although the city
administration has not adopted this policy, business firms
are themselves choosing to move certain functions out of
the downtown area in order to take advantage of lower
costs and greater supply of buildable land in the suburbs.
Fourth, the city could have chosen to use its
selective taxing power to increase local revenues. The
city has already burdened local business, however, with a
large number of taxes and charges including payroll taxes,
business license taxes, utility user taxes, commercial
tenants' occupancy taxes, sales taxes, transient lodger
taxes, sewer user charges and construction charges. These
additional costs have prompted the business community to
rally against any further charges. 5 0
Given the pervasive regulatory environment in
California it is not surprising that San Francisco decided
not to use any of the above methods but instead to devise
a package of regulatory devices promoting the production
- 11 -
of new housing units. In addition to OHPP, the city is
helping to identify new sites for housing, creating a new
financing mechanism to provide low interest home
mortgages, and legalizing secondary units. 5 1 While OHPP
is only one component of this plan, it has the potential
to satisfy a large portion of San Francisco's housing
need. The Regional Council of Governments has estimated
that demand for housing in the city would require the
addition of approximately 2,408 housing units per year
between 1980 and 1985.52 If office space continues to
be developed at the current rate, under the OHPP formula
discussed below, office developers would be required to
build or fund up to 1,333 units of housing per year.
Thus, OHPP could potentially supply 55% of San Francisco's
housing needs.
C. Rationale for OHPP
The underlying rationale for OHPP can be analyzed from
both theoretical and pragmatic perspectives. Windfall
recapture theory provides a useful theoretical framework;
although the term "windfall" refers to any increase in the
value of real estate not caused by the owner or general
inflation, "[e]xisting windfall recapture devices in
the United States are limited to attempts to recoup part
of the governmental costs associatd with new
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development."54 Two particular windfall recapture
techniques, exactions and land valuation taxation, are
particularly helpful in explaining the basis for OHPP.
An "exaction" is imposed when a developer is required
to fulfill a condition before the city will grant
subdivision approval, rezoning, conditional use or
building permits, or annexation.55 The goal of an
exaction is the internalization of external costs imposed
on the community by developers. When the local government
uses municipal revenues to pay for the public costs
generated by the new development,56 the developer reaps
a windfall. In theory, to recapture some of this benefit
to the developer, the community measures the anticipated
tax revenues of the development against the cost of the
public services it expects to supply to the project. If
revenues are less than costs, then the development is not
considered to pay its own way and the locality exacts a
payment, in money or in kind, from the developer. 5 7
Subdivision developers, for example, commonly are required
to pay for the public infrastructure that services their
development.58 The definition of public costs has
recently expanded to the point where cities may require
developers to dedicate sites or pay in-lieu fees for
schools 59 and parks. 60
OHPP expands the scope of public costs to include not
only costs of government, paid for by the community out of
municipal revenues, but also the costs absorbed by the
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community at large in the form of increased housing
costs. By implementing OHPP to alleviate the pressure
that the new office projects place on the housing market,
the city makes the judgement that the benefits of office
projects are not greater than the costs imposed on the
city unless the office developer internalizes the housing
costs of his project.61 The city is apparently
reasoning that office development creates an externality,
stemming from the fact that new offices attract new
residents to the city. This drives up demand for housing
and, consequently, raises the price of housing; the level
of office activity thus has a financial impact on the
housing market. OHPP is not designed as much to avoid
this impact as to shift the burden it creates to the
office sector.62 The program is redistributive, with
housing requirements imposed on developers for reasons of
equity rather than efficiency.
The second windfall recapture technique, land value
taxation, is based on the argument that the community has
the right to recapture the "unearned increment" in
increased land values. Proponents contend that the
largest share of increases in land value is due to such
factors as public and private improvements in surrounding
areas, paid for by people other than the landowner, and
the increase in demand for land caused by population
growth.63 It is argued that economic rent does not rise
spontaneously from the land, but represents value added by
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activities of the community as a whole.64 While courts
have not explicitly allowed cities to use exactions to
recapture unearned increments aside from specifically
65.defined social or governmental costs, language in
their opinions indicates that they may be implicitly
relying on the concept. 6 6
From the pragmatic perspective, it appears that city
officials are balancing general antidevelopment
sentiments, and the demands of vocal neighborhood housing
proponents,67 against potential court battles and the
loss of tax revenues if burdensome requirements force
developers and tenants to move to the suburbs or Oakland.
In setting both the cost of the OHPP housing contribution
and the office to housing ratio, the city's goal was to
shift costs to developers at a rate high enough to help
mitigate the housing situation yet low enough to ensure
that developers do not litigate or take their projects
elsewhere. Under OHPP, the city is relying on the
prosperous and fiscally beneficial office market to
subsidize the more problematical housing market.
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iii. Mechanics of OHPP
The OHPP housing requirement, which is only levied on
office buildings of greater than 50,000 square feet, 6 8
is calculated by the San Francisco City Planning
Department according to the following formula:
# units = gross sq.ft. office space x 1 worker/250 sq.ft.
x .4 x 1 unit/1.8 workers 69
This formula is based on the following assumptions:
1. 250 gross sq.ft. of office space would accomodate
one worker;
2. 40% of office workers would live in San Francisco;
3. The average household in San Francisco has 1.8
workers.70
The Mayor's Office of Housing and Community
Development (OHCD) administers the program, reviewing and
approving each developer's proposal to meet the particular
housing requirement computed by the planning department.
The developer may implement the requirement by
constructing new housing units or substantially
rehabilitating a vacant building.71 The developer may
elect to serve as an equity or development partner of a
housing development,72 to contribute to the financing of
a project, provided that the contribution is not used
solely to reduce the sale price of a housing unit already
under construction,73 or to contribute to the Home
- 16 -
Mortgage Assistance Trust, a pool of funds to be used for
shared appreciation mortgages,74 at a rate of $6,000 per
unit required.
The city has encouraged the production of multifamily
"affordable"7 5 housing units by defining a bedroom as a
unit and by offering incentives based on a credit system.
If the developer sponsors an affordable housing unit,
assisted by government subsidies, credit is granted for
two units. If a moderate-income unit is sponsored without
government subsidies, the developer receives credit for
three units; four credits are granted for a low-income
unit, sponsored without government subsidies.7 6
The city enforces the program by issuing a temporary
certificate of occupancy for the office only after the
developer has obtained preliminary approval of the housing
units from the city planning department. A final
certificate of occupancy is issued when the city planning
director finds that the construction of the new housing
development has begun. In the case of rehabilitation,
work must have begun or been completed, and the developer
must post a letter of credit equal to a portion of
rehabilitation costs. Alternatively, the developer
may invest $6,000 per unit in the shared appreciation pool
of the mortgage revenue bond program.78
The developer may transfer approved housing credits to
- 17 -
other office developments if he either abandons an office
project or accumulates a surplus of credits for a
particular office development.7 9
IV. COMPARISON OF GOALS AND OUTCOMES
From the program's initiation in late 1980 through
March 1983, it generated commitments for a total of 2637
housing units. Of these units, 1325 are for new
construction and 1312 are for rehabilitation.80 All of
the renovated units are underway or completed and, of the
new units, 437 are underway and 888 are proposals.8 1
Since the program has been in existence for only two
years, and some of the obligations remain proposals, it is
not yet possible to measure precisely its secondary
impacts in the housing market. Its potential impacts can
be estimated, however, through an analysis of the initial
reaction of office developers to the program. This
evaluation of the impact of OHPP is most usefully
considered within the context of the city's political and
economic goals in implementing the program: to produce
more housing units, particularly low- and moderate-income
units. 82
The city expects that the first goal, to increase the
overall supply of new housing, will be met. It should be
recognized, however, that not all the OHPP units produced
will necessarily be net adds to the housing stock.8 3
While housing developers who actually receive OHPP funds
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should increase production, this increase may cause a
decrease in the price of housing; some non-OHPP funded
housing developers may decide to leave the market.84 It
is also possible that some of the units produced with OHPP
funds would have been built without the funding, despite
the city's admonition that OHPP funds be used to produce
only those units that would not be produced "but for"
OHPP. 8 5
OHPP has succeeded politically insofar as it has
failed, so far, to cause a major exodus,86 or
rebellion,87 by office developers. Whether motivated by
the desire to maintain harmonious relations with the
planning department 88 or by the need to avoid costly
construction delays89 and penalties for finishing behind
schedule,90 office developers have generally complied
with the OHPP housing requirement.9 1 Although
developers consider OHPP to be an annoyance,92 they do
not find the price of participation prohibitive.9 3
Various estimates of the relative cost of OHPP range from
three to five dollars per square foot on construction
costs,94 compared to downtown office construction costs
of approximately $250 per square foot 9 5 ; the requirement
adds from ten to seventy cents per square foot on
rents, 9 6 while downtown rents average about $35 per
square foot.97 OHPP costs apparently have not been
worth the expense and delay of a lawsuit.9 8
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Office developers have adjusted to OHPP by treating it
as a credit game, involving a non-productive investment of
resources. After the city determines the number of units
the developer is obligated to fund, the developer is left
free to use his entrepreneurial talents to negotiate his
own deal in the housing market. Few office developers
consider building the housing themselves, for the
development industry is highly segregated and specialized;
commercial developers do not usually engage in residential
development and vice versa.99 Consequently, developers
devote staff resources to finding the least expensive deal
available. The particular method that a developer chooses
to fulfill the requirement depends on both the cost of the
deal and the nature of the development company.
Developers choose to sponsor housing projects rather
than participate in the mortgage revenue bond program only
if the cost per unit is less than $6000, 00 the cost of
contributing to the mortgage revenue bond program. Few of
the developers have actually paid as much as $6,000 per
unit because they have taken advantage of the multiple
credit incentive system. Several office developers have
funded the rehabilitation of floundering low income public
housing projects, at costs ranging from $2253/unit to
$4000/unit and $4951/unit.101 Homebuilders seeking
joint venture partners or selling housing credits approach
office developers, but the office developers generally
consider these deals too risky unless they know the
- 20 -
homebuilder or the deal is very attractive. Office
developers are also inundated with appeals from proponents
of small low-income housing projects who need a new source
of funding to replace diminishing public subsidies.102
Office developers typically do not consider these projects
as potential OHPP candidates due to fears that the housing
project will not get off the ground. 1 0 3 Finally, some
developers have responded to the OHPP housing requirement
by building luxury condominium on top of their office
buildings. A summary of all the OHPP deals made
from Dec. 1980 to March 1983 can be found in Appendix A.
The uneasy acceptance of OHPP by office developers in
the strong San Francisco commercial economy is only a
partial political success for the program. OHPP would
more closely match the city's objectives if it required
office developers to fund only low- and moderate-income
units.105 As indicated by the multiple credit incentive
system, the preferred objective of OHPP is to increase the
production of low- and moderate-income housing. Most
office developers are taking advantage of the incentive
system to sponsor low- and moderate-income housing, but
there is no guarantee that future office developers will
not follow the lead of some current developers and produce
only market-rate housing. This concern may become more
serious as the number of floundering public housing
projects available for OHPP contributions diminishes.
Although restructuring the program to require production
- 21 -
of low- and moderate-income housing might not avoid the
general problem of the production of units that are not
net adds to the housing stock, it would help to further
the more specific goal of providing housing for those who
need it most during the current housing shortage. 1 0 6
V. LEGALITY OF OHPP
OHPP is backed by the force of law only if San
Francisco is authorized to implement the program by some
statutory or state constitutional source of authority.
The substance of the program must further comply with
requirements of constitutionality. This section discusses
the availability of alternative affirmative sources of
legal authority and the limitations imposed by the state
and federal constitutions.
A. Affirmative Grants of Authority
1. Statutory Authority
The city relied on the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) for statutory authorization of
OHPP.107 CEQA empowers the city to require, first, that
environmental impact reports be prepared for office
buildingsl08 and, second, that significant effects on
the environment caused by the office buildings be
mitigated where feasible.109 San Francisco found
specific support for OHPP in 1979 amendments to CEQA
mandating consistency between environmental protection
policy and the provision of a safe and suitable living
- 22 -
policy and the provision of a safe and suitable living
environment for every Californian.ll1 To support the
proposition that the impact of office development on the
housing market is a significant environmental effect,
which the city could require developers to mitigate, the
city could point to the role of housing in providing a
"safe and suitable living environment" of Californians.
This expansive reading of CEQA, requiring mitigation
of impacts on both the socioeconomic and physical
environments, generated much controversy in the
development community as to whether CEQA could
appropriately be used as an instrument of social
policy. il The issue became moot, however, when the
California Legislature amended CEQA in 1981 to limit the
definition of "significant effects on the environment" to
substantial adverse changes in the physical
environment.ll2 A 1982 amendment then negated
contentions that CEQA alone confers independent authority
on public agencies to levy fees and impose exactions to
mitigate significant effects on the environment.1 1 3
2. Local Discretionary Review Power
Since the Legislature eliminated CEQA as a possible
source of authority, the city planning commision has been
imposing the program on the basis of its power to take
into consideration the effect of the proposed business on
surrounding property and residents when using its
- 23 -
imposition of requirements such as OHPP on permit
applicants, but the planning commission considers this
particular use of the power a temporary measure.115 The
commission plans to take further action to legitimate OHPP
after it has adopted new downtown zoning controls based on
a recent study of methods for contolling downtown growth.
3. Homerule Power as Authority to Enact an OHPP Ordinance
From a policy perspective, the disadvantages of the
current status of OHPP, unsanctioned by the Board of
Supervisors and existing solely as a creature of the
planning commission, outweigh its advantages. The
administration of the program under the commission's
discretionary review power, like the initial reliance on
CEQA, gives the planning commission flexibility to shape
the requirement to the needs of particular cases; such
flexibility, however, increases the likelihood of
political pressure and dealmaking. Office developers,
whose trade requires skill in negotiation, may well be
able to take advantage of a system that leaves open such
important items as the timing and price of the
contribution and the number of credits gained.
San Francisco could possibly use the homerule power
granted to it by the California Constitution to embody
OHPP in a municipal ordinance. Pursuant to this power,any
city in California may make and enforce valid local,
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
in conflict with general laws.ll6 Furthermore, the
- 24 -
state constitution enables San Francisco, as a charter
city, to make and enforce all ordinances and regulations
in respect to municipal affairs. 11 Thus, an OHPP
ordinance would be valid under these constitutional
provisions if it did not conflict with state law or it it
were viewed as a municipal affair.1 1 8
Arguably, a court could interpret the 1982 amendments
to CEQA, discussed above, as requiring explicit statutory
authorization for fees and exactions imposed in order to
mitigate environmental impacts. In enacting these CEQA
amendements, however, the Legislature stated that if the
California Constitution, a charter, or a statute generally
gave a city authority to levy fees or exactions for the
public welfare, the city could impose such fees or
exactions to mitigate significant effects on the
environment.119 Consequently, an OHPP ordinance enacted
pursuant to the city's homerule power to further the
public welfare would not conflict with the CEQA amendments.
The 1980 amendments to the housing statutes, 1 2 0
moreover, indicate legislative approval of local
governments' actions to meet the housing needs of their
citizens. These amendments specify the necessary contents
of the housing element of local general plans. The new
provisions require that all localities, including charter
121
cities, cooperate with the private sector in
providing housing for all economic segments of the
community,122 by such measures as assisting in the
development of low- and moderate-income housing.123 The
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Regional Council of Governments is empowered to analyze
each locality's share of the regional housing need, 1 2 4
but each locality is deemed best able to determine the
specific form of its contribution to the attainment of the
state housing goal.125 The regional nature of this
state-mandated approachl26 indicates that housing is not
a purely municipal affair.127 The statute's scope and
purpose, however, do not preclude local control.
Furthermore, a 1982 amendment to the housing element
legislation indicates that even if a city failed to adopt
a housing element by the required 1981 date,
non-residential projects approved before May 1983 on
condition that the non-residential developer cause housing
to be produced in accordance with planning commission
guidelines would not be invalidated. 128 This fact
situation so closely parallels OHPP that this amendment
could be interpreted as tacit legislative approval of
OHPP. In sum, OHPP implements rather than conflicts with
the state housing requirement,129 which could be
sufficient to authorize the city to pass an OHPP ordinance.
B. Constitutional Challenges to OHPP
When land use regulations attempt to achieve a
particular end by placing special burdens on one group,
landowners can challenge the regulations on due process
and equal protection grounds under the state and federal
constitutions.130 It is thus necessary to explore
whether OHPP (l)is reasonably related to a legitimate
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government objective, as is required by substantive due
process analysis; (2) effects a taking of a developer's
property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment; or (3) singles out office developers
for unfair treatment, as is prohibited by the guarantee of
equal protection. 131 It is also necessary to determine
whether OHPP violates Article XIII S 4 of the California
Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of special
taxes unless first sanctioned by a two-thirds vote of the
population.
1. Substantive Due Process
Courts adopt a deferential standard in reviewing the
constitutionality of a restriction regulating social and
economic relations; such restrictions are presumed valid
and "the burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature has acted in
an arbitrary and irrational way." 1 3 2 The courts require
only that the restriction be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.13 3 The Supreme Court has
ruled that if this requirement has been met, and the
restrictions are not arbitrary or discriminatory, due
process requirements are satisfied. If no other
constitutional restrictions apply, a state is then "free
to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed
to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose;" the courts have no
further say in the matter. 1 3 4 As stated in the Supreme
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Court's seminal zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler, "the
[zoning] ordinance now under review, and all similar laws
and regulations, must find their justification in some
aspect of the police power, asserted for the public
welfare." 135
In short, a land use restriction is valid if it is
"fairly debatable" 136 that the restriction bears a
reasonable relation to the public welfare.137 Two
issues, then, must be resolved: whether OHPP serves a
legitimate state interest, and whether the program is
structured to ensure a rational relation between the means
.138
and the end of the regulation.
a. Legitimate State Interest
The stated purpose of OHPP is to provide more housing
in San Francisco, particularly, but not exclusively, low-
and moderate-income housing. Thus, the program serves a
legitimate state interest, and is a valid exercise of the
police power, if the production of housing for all income
groupsl39 reasonably relates to the "public health,
safety, morals or general welfare." 1 4 0
Although challenges to the legitimacy of the state
interest in housing cases are typically concerned with the
production of housing through the expenditure of public
funds, rather than with regulatory measures such as OHPP,
the cases do help to define the extent of the police power
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in the housing field. In fact, in Berman v. Parker,1 4 1
the Supreme Court analyzed the legislative exercise of
eminent domain power to eliminate substandard housing
conditions in terms of the scope of the police power:
An attempt to define its limits is fruitless, for
each case must turn on its own facts. . .
Subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not
the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs to be served by social legislation . . . .
This principle admits of no exception merely
because the power of eminent domain is involved
. . . . Public safety, public health, morality,
peace and quiet, law and order - these are some
of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional applications of the police power to
municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate
the scope of the power and do not delimit it. 1 4 2
This "broad and inclusive"l43 notion of the public
welfare has been expanded over time. A typical early
ruling144 found that slum clearance, combined with the
construction of public housing for low-income families,
promoted the public welfare. Since then, courts have
found that either of these two elements suffices; the
construction of low-rent public housing, without the need
for accompanying slum clearance, has been found to promote
the public welfare,145 as has the clearance of both
blighted and unblighted areas within slums in order to
create a "balanced" community.146 Even middle-income
housing has been upheld as a valid promotion of public
welfare, under conditions of housing crisis when the
market fails to supply the needed units. 1 4 7
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These rulings indicate that OHPP serves a undoubted
legitimate state interest if it increases housing
opportunities for low- and moderate-income
households.1 4 8 The emphasis in these rulings is also
present in California's statutory definitions of
government activities which promote the public welfare:
government assistance to low- and moderate-income
households whose housing needs are not being met by
private enterprise,149 and density bonuses to developers
constructing at least 25% of a housing development for
low- and moderate-income households.150
It remains to be determined whether the courts would
consider the provision of housing for upper-income groups,
in and of itself, a legitimate state interest. The
California Legislature has expressed concern with the
adequate provision of housing for all economic segments of
the community, which of course includes the wealthy;1 5 1
the courts, however, generally base their approval of
affirmative government action in housing on a showing of a
housing shortage or of a prevalence of inadequate
housing.152 San Francisco meets this test as long as it
relies on OHPP to solve the housing shortage; the city
could thus require the office developers to build low-,
moderate-, and even middle-income housing. The production
of upper-income housing, on the other hand, may not serve
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a legitimate state interest, since this is the one sector
of the housing market which is currently being served by
private residential developers.1 5 3
San Francisco could argue, however, that the provision
of luxury housing is not an end but a means, in that more
luxury housing units would eventually result in more
moderate-income units through the "filtering"
process. 154 If San Francisco merely can demonstrate
that it is at least fairly debatable that filtering is
occurring,l55 then OHPP can be used to produce luxury
housing. At least one local study shows, however, that
"filtering up" rather than "filtering down" is taking
place in San Francisco.156 One manifestation of this
process is gentrification. Low-, moderate-, and
middle-income households are competing for the scarce
housing supply by doubling up or devoting a large
proportion of their incomes to housing. Because of this
phenomenon, houses are increasing in value and are being
transferred to higher-income households, rather than
eventually decreasing in value and becoming available to
lower-income households.157 Under these circumstances,
the production of luxury housing would not be a "means"
but only a legally questionable "end".
In sum, OHPP serves a legitimate state interest if
office developers invest in housing which the market is
failing to supply. If it is even fairly debatable that
housing is filtering from upper- to lower-income
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residents, the program can be used to fund luxury housing
even if the production of such housing, in itself, is held
not to serve a legitimate state interest.
b. Rational Relationship Between Means and End
OHPP may be used as a means to promote a legitimate
end if there is a rational nexus between "the service need
created by the development and that which is exacted as a
condition for development permission."l58 In other
words, the exaction must be designed to assist in
remedying a problem visited upon the community by virtue
of the activity upon which the exaction is imposed. While
the case law in this area has been developed primarily
through challenges to subdivision exactions,159 the
doctrine has also been applied to applications for other
kinds of changes in land use, such as building
160 .16116
permits, zoning variances, and rezonings.1 6 2
The municipality need not show that the developer's
activity is the specific and unique cause of the public
cost to which the exaction is related, 163 but only that
the exaction is reasonably related to the needs of the
proposed development.1 6 4 The California standard, as
formulated by Appeals Court in Scrutton v. County of
Sacramento, is more specific:
[C]onditions imposed on the grant of land use
applications are valid if reasonably conceived to
fulfill public needs emanating from the
landowner's proposed use. 1 6 5
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In applying the rational nexus test, California courts
have upheld exactions which are intended to benefit the
public as a whole, rather than limiting the effects of
permitted exactions to the needs of the developments in
question. The courts have also permitted exactions based
on projected future needs. In Ayres v. City Council of
Los Angeles,166 for example, the court held that the
city could require a subdivider to dedicate a strip of
land which abutted a major thoroughfare, but did not
provide access to the subdivision, to the city. The court
found that the subdivider had a duty to comply with
reasonable conditions to conform the welfare of the lot
owners to that of the public. The exaction was upheld,
even though it benefited not only the subdivision
residents but the city as a whole and was based on the
effects of future neighborhood population increases as
well as the present effects of the subdivision. 1 6 7
In Associated Homebuilders of the Greater Easy Bay,
Incorporated v. City of Walnut Creek, 1 6 8 the court
upheld a statutel69 authorizing localities to require
subdividers to dedicate land, or pay fees in lieu thereof,
for park or recreational purposes. The court,
interpreting the statute in the context of the urgency of
the need for parks and the rapid disappearance of open
land, held that it was unnecessary to find that the
particular subdivider would increase the need for parks to
such an extent that additional facilities would be
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needed.170 The court found instead that the statute was
justified by the "general public need for recreational
facilities caused by present and future
subdivisions."171 Dicta in the opinion goes further,
however, indicating that the object of the exaction does
not have to be specifically tied to the needs of the
residents of the development. The court notes the logic,
in some circumstances, of using fees tendered by
subdividers to purchase or develop land which would be
available for the use of subdivision residents, but which
would be at some distance from the development. The
contribution would not be used for the specific benefit of
the future residents of the subdivision, but would be
employed for facilities used by the general public:
If for example, the governing body of a city has
determined, as has the city in the present case,
that a specific amount of park land is required
for a stated number of inhabitants, if this
determination is reasonable, and there is a park
already developed close to the subdivision to
meet the needs of its residents, it seems
reasonable to employ the fee to purchase land in
another area of the city for park purposes to
maintain the proper balance between the number of
persons in the community and the amount of park
land available. 1 7 2
Thus, under the rationale of Ayres, Associated
Homebuilders, and Scrutton, San Francisco must be able to
show that the OHPP housing requirement is reasonably
conceived to fulfill a public need emanating from office
development. The city can meet this test by demonstrating
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that new downtown officesl73 attract new office workers
to San Francisco, a certain percentage of whom wish to
live in San Francisco.17 4
The profit potential of office projects may also
factor into the determination of the legitimacy of the
housing requirement. Courts are apparently influenced,
not only by the cost that the developer is imposing on
society, but also by the benefit that the developer
receives from the city's grant of permission to develop.
In Associated Homebuilders, the court summarized this
rationale as follows:
[The cases] reason that the subdivider realizes a
profit from governmental approval of a
subdivision since his land is rendered more
valuable by the fact of subdivision, and in
return for this benefit, the city may require him
to dedicate a portion of his land for park
purposes whenever the influx of new residents
will increase the need for park and recreational
facilities. (Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W. 2d 442, 448;
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,
144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d l82,187.) 75
Office developers may oppose this conception of the
scope of government power to impose OHPP on the basis that
housing is not a public cost. Unlike parks, sewers, roads
and schools, which have traditionally been financed by
local government, housing has traditionally been provided
by private enterprise and federal government subsidies.
If the courts accept the premise that solving the housing
shortage in San Francisco is at least as legitimate a
state interest as halting the destruction of open
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space,176 and is at least partially caused by office
development, however, this argument will fail. While
municipal governments may not themselves incur housing
costs as a result of the approval of office developments,
making the case for imposing government regulations to
increase the houing stock more attenuated, San Francisco
would argue that higher housing costs are imposed directly
on residents. Government intervention to mitigate the
problem is then a judgement by the city that the
production of housing is a rational and equitable way to
deal with the problem, just as the requirement that
subdividers contribute to park space has been deemed a
rational and equitable way to help mitigate the impacts of
these developments.
The city need not show that a particular office
building will, individually, create the need for more
housing, but only that the sum of new and anticipated
office developments will increase demand.17 7  The fact
that non-office workers may reside in the housing generatd
by OHPP is not fatal to the constitutionality of the
program, since the court in Ayres held that an exaction is
not improper even it benefits the city as a whole. The
tightest nexus between OHPP and housing production would
be created if OHPP funds were used to build housing that
exactly matched the income profile of tenants. In the
past, most office workers residing in the city have been
clerical or sales personnel, while the more wealthy
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professional and management personnel have tended to
commute from the suburbs.178 As a result of the current
tendency of professionals to move to the city, and of
firms to relocate clerical functions in the suburbs, it is
expected that most new workers moving to the city will be
in the moderate- and middle-income groups. 179 This
changing income profile suggests that OHPP funds be
concentrated in the production of moderate and
middle-income housing.
The dicta in Associated Homebuilders, discussed
above,180 however, could be interpreted to mean that the
housing built with OHPP funds need not exactly match the
income profile of office tenants. For example, if
middle-income professional personnel are moving into older
existing housing in former low-income neighborhoods,
displacing low-income households,181 San Francisco could
require that the OHPP funds be used to build low-housing
in order to maintain a balance between the income of
downtown residents and the variety of types of housing
units available.
The city must bear in mind, however, that this use of
exaction rationale is not unlimited. In Liberty II v.
California Coastal Commission,182 the court held that
the Coastal Commission could require a restaurant owner to
provide parking for restaurant customers; it could not,
however, require the owner to provide free parking for
beach users and the patrons of other restaurants. The
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court stated that the police power cannot be invoked to
impose conditions which are unrelated to the use of
property, and which simply shift the entire cost of a
public benefit to a property owner who is only a remote
beneficiary.1 8 3 To ensure that OHPP is not invalidated
on similar grounds - that the entire cost of a public
burden is being unfairly shifted to only one, fairly
remote source - San Francisco must be able to substantiate
the premise of a direct relationship between office
development and increased housing need.
A court will find that OHPP is valid if there is any
basis in reason that can be conceived for the program.
The city should be prepared, however, to litigate fully
the validity of its methodolgy in calculating the costs
and ratios forming the OHPP formula. The program operates
in a previously unregulated area and the city should be
ready to convince even the most skeptical court that it is
reasonable to believe that there is a rational nexus
between an increase in office space and increase in
housing demand. To be confident that OHPP meets this
requirement, the city should ensure that it has current
data demonstrating that the formula used to determine
housing contribution requirements is an accurate
reflection of the impact of office buildings on the
housing market.
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2. Taking Without Just Compensation
Under the United State Supreme Court's current test to
determine when a regulation results in an unconstitutional
taking of property without just compensation, it is
unlikely that a court would find that OHPP effects a
"taking". The test, as articulated in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York Cityl84 emphasizes ad
hoc factual inquiries into the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant, the reasonable necessity of
the restriction to effectuate a substantial public
purpose, and the character of the governmental action.
The Court has upheld land use regulations which
promote the public welfare even if they substantially
diminish the value of property;l85 if the land use
regulation is reasonably related to the promotion of the
general welfare, a diminution in property value will not
in itself effect a taking.186 Since OHPP amounts to
less than 3% of the cost of an office project,187 the
program cannot even be considered to have substantially
reduced the value of the property.188 Moreover, the
program does not interfere with the office developer's
plans for his property and still allows him a reasonable
return on his investment. Consequently, OHPP would not be
ruled facially invalid on these grounds, although it would
be necessary to examine the circumstances of individual
cases.
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Office developers might attempt to characterize OHPP
189
as a physical taking, however, by pointing out that
most land use regulations either prevent developers from
taking certain actions or force developers to continue
past practices. 1 9 0 OHPP, it could be argued, is a
different kind of imposition, since it forces commercial
developers to take affirmative action to engage in
residential development, a totally new endeavor. Because
the city has given office developers the option of
donating money instead of building, however, this argument
will not succeed against OHPP.
A court might find it objectionable that OHPP could
result in a transfer of benefit from one private party,
commercial developers, to private residential developers,
another private party. If the transfer of benefit is
merely incidental to the promotion of the public welfare,
however, a court is unlikely to find that the third party
benefit has resulted in a taking or is an excessive use of
the police power.
3. Equal Protection
The structure of OHPP raises several questions
relating to the fairness of the program. The first is why
office developers must bear the burden of providing
housing when hotel or shopping center developers, for
example, do not have to meet the same requirement. The
city is apparently imposing different regulations on
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different classes of developers. As OHPP regulates
socioeconomic relations, a court reviewing the program on
an equal protection challenge need only ensure that the
classification is not "palpably arbitrary." 191 Since
the Supreme Court has ruled that housing does not rise to
the level of a fundamental interest,192 no more
stringent standard of review than "mere rationality" would
apply.
It is not accurate to state, however, that office
developers alone must provide housing. San Francisco has
been consistent in its attempts to extract contributions
to housing from all applicants for land use changes. It
has imposed an inclusionary zoning system on residential
developers,193 and required one-for-one replacement in
connection with residential hotel conversions.1 9 4
In any event, "there is no constitutional requirement
that a regulation, in other respects permissible, must
reach every class to which it might be applied - that the
legislature must be held to the choice of regulating all
or none." 1 9 5 For example, in Norsco Enterprises v. City
of Fremont,196 the city had imposed a fee towards park
provision when an apartment house was converted into
condominiums; no such requirement had been imposed on the
same building when the units it contained were apartments
rather than condominiums. The court held that the
classification was not palpably erroneous or arbitrary,
despite the contention of the applicant for conversion
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that he had been denied equal protection because the city
treated like things differently. The court reasoned that
the legislature must have had information showing that
condominium developments, unlike buildings with rental
units, lack centralized management and thus present
additional land use problems.197 Similarly, San
Francisco could argue that new large office buildings,
unlike hotels, retail establishments or existing office
buildings tend to attract a large number of new residents
to the city, justifying different conditions.
The second aspect of the program that raises fairness
questions is the fact that office developers are required
to mitigate impacts on housing but not on other land uses,
such as restaurants or retail shops, that are functionally
or fiscally related to office buildings. This exclusive
focus on housing is also unlikely to be considered
unconstitutionally discriminatory. The court has held
that "[t]he Legislature is not bound, in order to adopt a
constitutionally valid statute, to extend it to all cases
which might possibly be reached, but is free . . . to
confine its regulations to those classes of cases in which
198
the need is deemed to be most evident". San
Francisco could thus argue that the imperfections in the
housing market are not necessarily evident in other
markets.
In sum, equal protection challenges to OHPP would be
hampered by the deference of the courts to legislative
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determinations, as exhibited by the willingness of the
court in Norsco Enterprises to impute worthwhile motives
to apparently discriminatory measures.
4. Proposition 13
Since the enactment of Article XIIIA of the California
Constitution, popularly known as Proposition 13,199 a
number of land use fees and exactions have been challenged
as "special taxes". 20 0 Unless approved by two-thirds of
the electorate, such taxes are prohibited by S 4 of the
Article. 2 0 1 A determination of whether OHPP violates
S 4 depends on whether the housing contribution
requirement falls within the definition of a special tax.
While "[t]he term 'special taxes' is ambiguous in the
sense that it has been interpreted to mean different
things in different contexts", 2 0 2 the California Court
of Appeals has explicitly examined the applicability of
S 4 to exactions which are based on a rationale similar to
that of OHPP. In Trent Meredith v. City of Oxnard, 2 0 3
the court held that an exaction imposed on subdivisions to
help provide school facilities was not a special tax. The
court stated that the Attorney General's definition of
special taxes, which included "any new or additional taxes
imposed for revenue purposes", 2 0 4 was too broad 2 0 5 as
it did not consider the purpose of the fee and the
regulatory nature of the fee. It is thus necessary to
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examine whether OHPP (1) falls within the purpose of S 4,
and (2) is imposed for regulatory rather than revenue
purposes.
Courts examining the purpose and scope of S 4206
generally refer to the construction it was given in Amador
Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization2 07in which the California Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of various provisions of Art.
XIIIA. Section 4 is one of four tax limitations in the
Article;208 the other three limitations are a real
property tax rate limitation (S 1), a real property
assessment limitation (S 2), and a restriction of state
taxes (S 3). According to the Amador analysis, these four
limitations are interdependent, and the S 4 curb on local
taxes serves to limit the locality's ability to use a
local tax to replace funds from the other sources. 2 0 9
While the broadest reading of "tax" as used in S 4
would require a two-thirds vote for all charges, "however
labeled, which are to exact money for the support of
government or for public purposes",2 1 0 the courts have
construed the scope of the provision more narrowly. They
have excluded, for example, fees conferring direct
benefits on the individual charged.211 The court in
Trent Meredith also interpreted the purposes of S 4
narrowly, distinguishing fees imposed on the privilege of
subdividing land from fees imposed on land as such.2 1 2
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The court decided that, even if the exaction were found to
be a tax, it was not a special tax.
It would thus appear that OHPP's purpose does not
place it within the scope of S 4, according to the Amador
test; if housing has not been funded by property tax
revenues in the past, the money raised through OHPP will
not be used to replace funds reduced by other sections of
Article XIIIA.
The second test for an exaction under S 4, according
to Trent Meredith, is whether it is imposed for regulatory
or revenue purposes. This test inquires into whether the
exaction can even be characterized as a tax. In
determining that the exaction for school facilities was
regulatory, and thus outside the scope of S 4, the court
in Trent Meredith emphasized the relation of the exaction
to benefits received and burdens created. The court
stated that, unlike taxes which need not be related to
benefits and burdens, the school exaction at issue, like
the park exaction in Associated Homebuilders, 2 1 3 was
expressly limited to the amount of land or fees which had
a reasonable relationship to the need for parks and
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schools.214 This reasoning echoes the opinion in Mills
v. County of Trinity:
Traditionally, courts have determined whether a
local governmental charge denominated a
regulatory fee is an exercise of the police power
or the power to raise revenue by analyzing the
use of the fee involved rather than relying on
its label . . . [citation omitted]. The general
rule is that a regulatory fee must not 'exceed
the sum reasonably necessary to cover the costs
of the regulatory purpose sought' in order to be
considered as a fee rather than a guise for a
tax. . . . [citation omitted] 2 1 5
Section 4, then, does not include fees which do not
exceed the reasonable cost of the regulatory service and
which are not levied for unrelated revenue purposes.216
Consequently, if the cost per housing unit under OHPP does
not exceed an amount which bears a reasonable relationship
to the housing need generated by the office development,
and the OHPP funds are not placed in general revenues but
are used to produce housing, then the exaction would be
considered to be levied for regulatory rather than revenue
purposes. The current cost of participation, set at
$6,000 per required housing unit is not based on objective
standards related to the cost of producing housing.
Rather than setting an arbitrary fee per unit, the city
should more precisely relate the required level of
participation to the investment necessary to generate a
housing unit.217 The amount charged under OHPP must not
exceed the costs incurred in responding to the housing
problem generated by the offices.
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In sum, although the courts' pronouncements on many
issues of the special tax are neither consistent nor
comprehensive, OHPP would probably not be defined as a
special tax under the Trent Meredith test and related
decisions of the California courts. This outcome would
comport with the court's latest pronouncement on the
special tax issue, in which it stated that "the language
of S 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities therein
resolved so as to limit the measures to which the
two-thirds requirement applies."218
VI. SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS
The previous discussion has indicated that, in order
both to decrease the political overtones of OHPP and to
improve its enforceability and legality, the city can and
should codify OHPP in an ordinance that spells out the
details of the program.219 OHPP represents a
significant step in shifting costs to office developers;
such a substantial change in policy should be implemented
only with legislative approval. Moreover, substantive due
process and equal protection analyses are premised on the
notion of judicial deference to legislative decisions.
Presumably an ordinance that is officially sanctioned by
the Board of Supervisors is more representative of and
more responsive to the needs of various groups of
constituents. Embodying OHPP in an ordinance would give
the program a more substantial legal underpinning, as well
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as helping to remove any doubts that it is a personal
program of the planning commission and planning staff. 2 2 0
Once it is established that the city has the authority
to implement OHPP, the program should withstand
constitutional challenges. The law merely requires that
the production of housing serve a legitimate state
interest in solving the housing shortage, and that an
increase in office space be linked to an increase in
housing demand. The development of any kind of housing
through OHPP contributions, including luxury housing, will
probably be legally acceptable as long as the success of
filtering is fairly debatable. The city may decide,
however, to specify that office developers satisfy the
OHPP requirement by producing only low- and
moderate-income housing, in order to correct the current
market imbalance and to establish that the program
furthers an unquestionably legitimate state interest.
While legal challenges to OHPP do not seem too
formidable, the implementation of the program must also be
considered outside the legal context; the city has to
balance the need to retain development tax dollars against
the desire to structure a rational program that meets its
goal of producing low- and moderate-income housing units.
In addition to the modifications recommended above to
strengthen OHPP's legal status, political, economic, and
administrative considerations suggest the following
changes in the program's current structure.
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A. Mandatory Program with Internal Checks
The major impact of OHPP is to redistribute some of
the rights that office developers previously associated
with the ownership of private property; a new social
burden is placed on office development by the program.
Developers may resist this attempt to force them to
internalize the costs of their projects in several ways.
First, office developers will probably attempt to pass the
costs to tenants in the form of higher rents. Although
these increased rents may more accurately reflect the cost
of office space in terms of its impact on the city, the
price hike may convince more office tenants to move some
or all of their functions away from downtown San
Francisco. Second, office developers may lobby to prevent
passage of an OHPP ordinance.2 2 1
The city could attempt to bypass these problems by
implementing OHPP on an incentive rather than a mandatory
basis. In an incentive system,222 the city uses its
zoning power to provide the developer with a bonus
marginally greater in value than the cost of providing an
amenity desired by the city.223 In return for giving
something to the public, the developer may obtain
permission to build extra rentable space or a promise of
reduced time for review and paperwork. 2 2 4
Incentive zoning also raises some problems. First, an
incentive system does not always produce the desired or
expected results. For example, an incentive OHPP-type
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program in Toronto, Canada has resulted in a surplus of
high-income housing;225 incentive inclusionary zoning in
California has not produced a sufficient amount of low-
and moderate-income housing;226 and it has been argued
that the incentive zoning system in New York has resulted
in too many lifeless plazas and arcades overshadowed by
skyscrapers.227 Second, if existing height and bulk
regulations meet developers' needs, the necessity of
downzoning prior to the institution of an incentive zoning
system may create political difficulties. Third,
incentive zoning undermines the validity of existing
height and bulk regulations,228 which seem arbitrary
once the city grants exceptions to them in deals with
developers. Because of these problems, the implementation
of OHPP on an incentive basis is not recommended.
It is possible, however, to incorporate features of
both incentive and mandatory programs in order to avoid
some of the problems inherent in each. San Francisco
could continue to require office developers to contribute
to housing, for example, but reward participation with a
bonus.229 The problem with this proposal lies in
determining the nature of the appropriate bonus. Granting
additional rentable space could result in too great an
overall increase in office development, while granting
procedural bonuses probably would make non-OHPP developers
insist that the city streamline the permit process for all
development.
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Given the strong development market in San Francisco,
the city can probably continue to dictate the terms of
OHPP to office developers without needing to offer
bonuses.230 OHPP will be successful on this basis,
however, only as long as office developers continue to
reap enough return on their investments to make it worth
their while to remain in San Francisco. If increasing
vacancy rates and declining rental rates force office
developers to leave, then the city will have to reconsider
the desirability of shifting housing costs to the office
developers.231 The city should thus have a team
monitoring the impact of OHPP on the office and housing
markets. 2 3 2  Factors to be examined should include: (1)
the income levels of office workers; (2) the percentage of
office workers living in San Francisco; (3) the amount and
type of OHPP production as a percentage of total
production; and (4) OHPP's impact on office and housing
rental rates and housing sales prices. The ordinance
should be amended if any of the collected data indicates
that the program is not achieving its goals.
B. Coordination Between Office Developers'Contributions
and City Housing Needs
The use of OHPP funds to produce low- and
moderate-income housing, and the requirement that the city
monitor the success of the program, are only first steps
in ensuring that the program meets its goals. Other
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important factors in the success of the program include
(1) the ability to make inroads on the citywide need for
specific types of units (i.e. housing for the elderly and
handicapped, and multifamily housing); (2) the
coordination of the location and timing of housing
developments with the availability of complementary city
programs (i.e.schools, infrastructue, day care centers);
and (3)the need for new investment in specified areas of
the city(i.e.urban renewal zones).
The great strength of OHPP is that it gives planners
the power to implement planning goals through affirmative,
rather than the more usual negative measures. The
program's current structure, however, does not provide
assurance that the resultant housing will be of a type, or
produced at a time or in a location, that comports with
the city's general plan. This is because the existing
option system, whereby office developers obtain the
requisite number of credits by building, sponsoring or
funding housing units, has created a market of housing
credits; when their only goal is to accumulate the minimum
required number of housing credits, office developers have
no incentive to consider anything besides cost.
Most office developers have little experience with
residential development, and are especially hesitant to
sponsor low- and moderate-income housing. This is
evidenced by their reluctance to contribute to, or
participate as joint-venture partners in, low-income
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housing projects developed by non-profit housing
.233
organizations. The city needs to modify the program
to ensure that the OHPP funds produce projects that
implement city objectives. One way to encourage such
projects would be to give the OHCD or, perhaps, an
independent joint public/private body a stronger
coordinating role. Instead of simply approving deals that
office developers have already made with residential
developers, this coordinator would act as an intermediary,
or broker, between office developers and low- and
moderate-income housing developers. Office developers
could be required to contribute a set amount per unit to a
housing trust fund, administered by either the independent
public/private body or by OHCD. Low- and
moderate-income housing developers would take their
projects to this coordinator, which would approve only
those projects that implemented the city housing plan.
Approved projects would then be eligible to receive funds
from the housing trust fund. Since developers would only
be allowed to make donations to the fund at a fixed cost
per unit, instead of making deals on the market as is
presently the case, this system would guarantee that each
developer carried his proportional share of the housing
burden and that the units produced fulfilled city
objectives.
Alternatively, OHCD could send approved housing
developers to office developers and allow them to work out
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their own deal. The advantage of this approach is that it
reduces the amount of bureaucratic involvement and might
encourage more creative arrangements;235 furthermore,
with the city as the responsible intermediary, office
developers would no longer be concerned with the risk of
failure of low-income housing projects, while proponents
of such projects would no longer have to rely on outside
third parties to recommend them to office
developers.236 Office developers may not find this
alternative attractive, however, because of increased
transaction costs and decreased certainty. Moreover,
individual arrangements would not result in a standard
price of participation, reducing the equity of the
requirement.
To suggest that the city take more affirmative steps
to increase its power and rights 2 3 7 is not a
recommendation that the city itself become a housing
developer. The rationale for public sector land
development,238 however, does lead to the conclusion
that San Francisco must play a stronger role both to
overcome legal and institutional obstacles to expansion
and to ensure that broader social goals influence the
allocaton of new investment in the housing market.2 3 9
The mandatory donation requirement set at a fixed cost
per unit should not only be more advantageous to office
developers, the city, and residential developers, but it
should also comport better with the concept of a
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partnership capitalizing on each partner's area of
expertise. The office developer can eliminate the time
and transaction costs associated with the search for cheap
units and can predict costs at an earlier date.240 The
city can use its own special powers - reserving sites,
setting densities, combining funding from various sources,
zoning, tax-exempt financing, tax abatement - to ensure
that the type, timing, and location of the OHPP units
implement the housing goals. Since all housing would be
built by residential developers, this system would also
allay any existing fears that office developers are
usurping residential developers' business.
VII. CONCLUSION
OHPP is a noteworthy example of a local planning body
acting affirmatively to solve community problems. The
impetus for programs such as OHPP arises from a desire on
the part of the public sector to compel the private sector
to accept responsibility for problems that their projects
either create or exacerbate. In the case of OHPP, the
city requires office developers to internalize the housing
costs generated by their projects, in return for being
given the opportunity to reap a profit. OHPP reflects a
belief that projects have a wide range of impacts for
which developers should be held financially accountable;
the potential reach of such programs is legally limited
only by the need to demonstrate that the program furthers
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the public welfare and is a rational way to mitigate
impacts of development.
In order to gain acceptance of such innovative,
activist measures, however, city governments cannot merely
satisfy the letter of the law. The success of such
programs hinges on the ability of the city to strike a
balance between public benefits and private burdens.
Political realities demand that the city take a hard look
at the consequences of such programs: developers may lose
their incentive to invest in communities that impose
costly and onerous building conditions and may take their
entrepeneurial talents elsewhere. Before shifting costs
to the private sector, the city should be able to
demonstrate that the cost is clearly attributable to the
project, that the program is structured to produce the
desired outcome with minimal negative side effects, that
responsibilities for implementation are distributed
rationally, and, most important, that the underlying
concept has been sanctioned by the legislative body.
When cities shift a number of costs, one at a time, to
developers, public sector representatives may lose sight
of the fact that they are chipping away at the incentives
that encourage private enterprise. Cities have gradually
raised the level of developers' responsibility for
community costs from infrastructure to parks and schools
and, under the OHPP program, to housing. This succession
of development requirements is bound, at some point, to
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redistribute substantially the current assignment of
public and private responsibilities. It is not clear that
local, rather than state or federal, bodies should be
effecting such fundamental changes. If it is presumed,
however, that local bodies at least have the power to
solve problems in their own jurisdictions, they should not
impose such consequential policies without local
legislative approval.
- 57 -
FOOTNOTES
1. Press Release of San Francisco Mayor Diane
Feinstein (Apr. 9, 1981) (hereinafter cited as Feinstein
Press Release).
2. See Guenther, Outlook in Low Cost Housing Is
Gloomy as Programs Expire, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982 at
33, col. 1 (The article quotes a developer from the
National Corporation for Housing Partnership, a
congressionally chartered developer, who stated that his
company would only be able to produce rental housing for
the upper-income market unless interest rates are reduced
to 7 1/2%).
3. Telephone interview with Bruce McCormick, planner
and zoning specialist at the Zoning and Official Plans
Division of the Toronto Planning and Development
Department (Nov. 26, 1980).
4.. See Planning Gain, Plan. Bull., April 23, 1982,
at 2, col. 1 (bulletin of the Town and Contry Planning
Ass'n in London, England).
5. Brown, New Activism in Zoning, Building Design
and Construction, Sept. 1982, at 46.
6. See Moberg, The Santa Monica Story - From Rent
Control To Municipal Power, In These Times Jan. 12-18,
1983, at 11; see also United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joinders of America v. City of Santa Monica, No. WEC
069227 (Superior Court of Cal. for the County of Los
Angeles) (Dec. 23, 1981) (order granting preliminary
injunction). In this case, the union challenged the
legality of a building moratorium during the period of
which the city would allow interim permits under certain
specified conditions. Such conditions for commercial and
industrial development included: (1) arts and social
service fee of 1.5% of total costs for projects under 7500
sq. ft.; (2) one low- or moderate-income housing unit of
5000 sq. ft. or an in-lieu fee of 6.5% of project costs
plus (1) above for projects between 7500-20,000 sq. ft.;
(3) traffic and emission abatement plan plus (1) and (2)
above for projects between 20,000-40,000 sq. ft.; (4) day
care center plus (1),(2), and (3) above for projects
between 40,000-70,000 sq. ft.; and (5) open space plus
(1), (2), (3), and (4) above for projects over 70,000 sq.
ft. The court said that in order to justify exactions
"there must be a rational relation between the benefit
conferred on the developer by the community and the burden
on the public created by the development", and held that
it was counterproductive to declare and extend a
moratorium when there was a housing shortage and high
unemployment.
- 58 -
7. Interested cities include Stamford, Connecticut,
Santa Barbara, California, Sydney, Australia, and Boston,
Mass. An Exaction That Really Works, Plan, Oct. 1982,
at 6; Boston City Council, Expanding Housing Development
in Boston (Feb. 1, 1983) (Committee on Planning,
Development, and Housing).
8. The concept of linking office and housing markets
originated with Petition No. 65447 dated June 9, 1980,
sponsored by several of San Francisco's housing
activists. The petition requested that the city planning
code be amended to institute a housing requirement for
office developments. Interview with John Elberling of
TODCO in San Francisco (July 22, 1982); interview with
Toby Rosenblatt, San Francisco Planning Commissioner (July
14, 1982). Mayor Feinstein presented the program on Apr.
9, 1981 although three developers had already agreed to
comply with the requirement since Dec. 1980.
9. City and County of San Francisco Citizens Housing
Task Force, Report of the Citizens Housing Task Force, 1
(July 29, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
10. Coldwell Banker, San Francisco '82: A Coldwell
Banker Real Estate Overview for Business, Transcript of
Remarks 15 (Dec. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Coldwell
Banker 1982]; see also Lefcoe, When Governments Become
Land Developers: Notes on the Public-Sector Experience in
the Netherlands and California, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 165,
195 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lefcoe, When Governments
Become Land Developers] (in general, at high interest
rates buyers tend to withdraw from the market and invest
instead in short-term durables).
11. San Francisco Dep't of City Planning, A Proposed
Revision of the Residence Element of the Comprehensive
Plan of the City and County of San Francsico 1.14-1.15
(June 1982) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Residence
Element].
12. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 62, 64.
13. Proposed Residence Element, supra note 11, at
1.3; see also M. Sumichrast & M. Seldin, Housing
Markets: The Complete Guide to Analysis And Strategy For
Builders, Lenders, and Other Investors 103 (1977) (total
number of heads of households in the United States
increased from 1970-1980).
14. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 36; see also
M. Sumichrast & M. Seldin, spra note 13, at 103 (basic
relationship between number of1households and housing
demand).
- 59 -
15. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 62 (growth
in professional and managerial sectors); San Francisco
Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco's Strategic Plan, Phase
I Management Summary 12 (May 1982) (growth in the service
sector) [hereinafter cited as Strategic Plan] .
16. Coldwell Banker 1982, supra note 10, at 10, 14;
see also Strategic Plan, supra note 15, at 11.
17. Coldwell Banker 1982, supra note 10, at 14.
18. Guenther, supra note 2; see also San Francisco
Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco Data Sheet (Aug. 1982).
A 30 year mortgage at 15% interest on 80% of $146,300, the
median price of a new home in San Francisco, is
$17,825/yr. If housing payments should amount to no more
than 30% of annual income then a household would need to
earn $59,417/yr. to afford such a house. In fact, the
median income in San Francisco for a household of three is
$27,450. Proposed Residence Element, supra note 11, at
1.33.
19. The city administration estimates that
approximately 80,970 or 27% of San Francisco's total
households are low or moderate income households, living
in inadequate conditions. City and County of San
Francisco, Mayor's Office of Housing and Community
Development, 1983 Community Development Program and
Housing Assistance Plan, Preliminary Proposal 7 (Aug.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Community Development Program].
20. Proposed Residence Element, supra note 11, at
1.23 [citing Revised Estimates from Association of Bay
Area Governments, Housing Needs Report, San Francisco Bay
Area (Dec. 1981)] [hereinafter cited as ABAG Report].
21. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 4.
22. The public expressed its frustration with the
housing shortage by voting for Proposition K on November
4, 1980, registering approval for the encouragement of the
development of 20,000 new housing units in San Francisco
by 1985. Proposed Residence Element, supra note 11, at
1.38.
23. Housing Affairs Letter, Feb. 12, 1982, at 2, col
1 (CD Publications).
- 60 -
24. Telephone interview with S. Small, Public
Affairs Officer at Dep't of Housing and Urb. Dev't Area
Office in San Francisco (Nov. 1982) (federal cutbacks in
F.Y. 81 and 82 resulted in reduced spending under the
Section 8 new construction, Section 312 rehabilitation and
Section 202 elderly and handicapped housing programs in
San Francisco); see also Feinstein Press Release, supra
note 1 ("[in 1981], the loss of federal funds will
guillotine plans to add 550 low or moderate income units
in San Francisco"); Community Development Program, supra
note 19, at intro. (The Mayor reports that San Francisco
expects to receive $20 million in Community Development
Block Grant funds in 1983 which is $4 million less than in
1982.).
25. Brown, supra note 5, at 42.
26. Coldwell Banker 1982, supra note 10, at 7, 26.
27. Strategic Plan, supra note 15, at 12.
28. Coldwell Banker 1982, supra note 10, at 17.
29. Coldwell Banker, The Commercial Real Estate
Market in The San Francisco Bay Area - 1983 (Dec. 1982),
at 6 [hereinafter cited as Coldwell Banker 1983].
30. Coldwell Banker 1982, supra note 10, at 18.
31. Id. at 13; See generally memorandum from San
Francisco Planning Director Dean Macris to San Francisco
City Planning Commision 8-11 (Nov. 18, 1981) (discussing
office development trends and projections). Compare Task
Force Report, supra note 9, at 54 ("Including indirect and
induced employment effects, office sector expansion by
itself will add about 56,000 new jobs to the city's
economy between 1980 and 1985.').
32. Memorandum from San Francisco Planning Director
Dean Macris to the San Francisco Planning Commission 8
(Nov. 18, 1981).
33. Some firms, such as Standard Oil, Bank of
America, Bechtel, Pacific Telephone, P.G.& E., and
Fireman's Fund Insurance have been looking to the cities
on the peninsula south of San Francisco, the East Bay, or
Marin County to relocate some of their business functions
in order to lower occupancy costs. Clerical workers are
often moved to the suburbs, leaving executive and
administrative staff downtown. Coldwell Banker 1982,
supra note 10, at 21; see also Task Force Report, supra
note 9, at 40, 62.
- 61 -
34. Coldwell Banker 1983, supra note 29, at 7-8.
35. Coldwell Banker 1983, supra note 29, at 8.
36. Id. at 6.
37. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d
266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd 447
U.S. 255 (1980) (downzoning); Associated Homebuilders of
the Greater East Bay v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (subdivision
exactions); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.
3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd 453
U.S. 490 (1981) (billboard restrictions).
38. Cal. Gov't Code SS 65580-65589 (West Supp.
1981). See generally Burton, California Legislature
Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning, Mandates Fair Share:
Inclusionary Housing Programs a Likely Response, 9 San
Fern. V.L. Rev. 19, 24-29 (1981); Lefcoe, California's
Land Planning Requirements: The Case For Deregulation, 54
S. Cal. L. Rev. 447, 475-488 (1981).
39. All cities and counties in California must
"adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the
physical development of the county or city." Cal. Gov't
Code § 65300 (West 1966).
40. Id. at S 65583.
41. Id. at § 65583(c)(2).
42. Id. at S 65580(b).
43. Such actions range from Proposition 0, the
high-rise initiative on the Nov. 1979 ballot, to a
lawsuit by San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth (housing
activist group) against the San Francisco Planning
Commission and Planning Department seeking a moratorium on
downtown development until the downtown environmental
impact report examining new methods of controlling
downtown growth is finished.
44. Interview with Dick Morton of the San Francisco
Chamber of Commerce (July 7, 1982); see also Strategic
Plan, supra note 15.
45. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 267-79 (cited in
Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 23, [brief filed 12/22/81, argument set for
1/18/82], Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San
Francisco, No. 786-779).
- 62 -
46. San Francisco, Cal., Subdivision Code S 1341
(condominium conversion) (cited in id. at 23); San
Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 330-81 (residential hotel
conversion) (cited in id. at 2).
47. San Francisco, Cal., Admin. Code ch. 38
(ordinance 224-81) (May 5, 1981) The transit impact
development fee is a five dollar per square foot charge on
new office space in downtown to be used to expand
transportation facilities to accomodate the increased
ridership. The validity of the fee is currently in
litigation in the Superior Court of Cal. in San Francisco,
Russ Building Partnership v. City and County of San
Francisco, No. 780-795). Plans for a transit assessment
district have been temporarily shelved. Johnston,
Supervisors Sideline Transit Tax for Downtown, San
Francisco Examiner, July 13, 1982, at S B, col. 1.
48 Several development scenarios for the downtown
C-3 district are currently being analyzed in an
environmental impact report by Enviromental Science
Associates of San Francisco. Interview with Paul Zigman,
Director of Enviromental Science Associates (June 11,
1982); City and County of San Francisco, Department of
City Planning, Guiding Downtown Development (July 1981).
49. Kilduff, San Franicsco's Novel Scheme To Provide
Affordable Housing, XII Cal. J. 169 (May 1982).
50. See Deloitte, Haskins and Sills, Comparative
Study of Taxes and Other Charges Paid by Business in San
Francisco and Other Areas - Summary (May 1981)
(commissioned by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce);
see also Arthur Andersen & Co., Downtown Highrise District
Cost Revenue Study (Nov. 1980); Strategic Plan, supra note
15.
51. San Francisco Planning and Urban Research
Association, The Mayor's Housing Program: A Cautious
Approach to a Large and Complex Problem, 174 SPUR Report 1
(June 1981) [hereinafter cited as SPUR Report].
52. The Association of Bay Area Governments, (ABAG),
the regional council of governments charged with assessing
the housing need for the San Francisco Bay area has
determined that the projected increase in housing need in
San Francisco from 1980-1985 is 12,042 housing units.
ABAG Report, supra note 20, at 29.
53 D. Hagman & D. Miscynski, Windfalls For
Wipeouts 15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as D. Hagman].
- 63 -
54. Id. at xxxv.
55. Id. at xxxvi, 342.
56. Id. at 364.
57. Frieden, Allocating the Public Service Costs of
New Housing 14 (original paper on file with author)
(published in revised form in Urb. Land, Jan. 1980 at
12-16).
58. Id. at 5-6; see also D. Hagman, supra note 53,
at 349.
59. See, e.g., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of
Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981).
60. See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders, 4 Cal. 3d
633; Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218
N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
61. See Kilduff, supra note 49, at 169 (OHPP is an
outgrowth of a strong trend to make downtown developers
pay for more services).
62. See generally Baumol & Oates, The Theory of
Environmental Policy; Externalities, Public Outlays, and
the Quality of Life (1975) (detailed discussion of the
difference between pecuniary externalities, which result
from a change in the prices of some inputs or outputs in
the economy, and technological externalities, which
produce resource misallocation).
63. D. Hagman, supra note 53, at 400.
64. More Progress And Less Poverty - A Business Man
Reviews Henry George 96 (J. Thompson ed. 1942).
65. D. Hagman, supra note 53, at 364.
66. See id. at 33; see also Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324,
366, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), aff'd 439 U.S. 104, ("It is
that privately created and privately managed ingredient
which is the property on which the reasonable return is to
be based. All else is society's contribution by the sweat
of its brow and the expenditure of its funds. To that
extent society is also entitled to its due.").
67. Kilduff, supra note 49, at 169.
- 64 -
68. Meeting of the American Planning Association in
San Francisco (July 14, 1982) (discussing OHPP); SPUR
Report, supra note 51, at 1. The city has also had to
decide whether OHPP should be imposed only on office
buildings attracting new tenants to the city or also on
office buildings attracting relocating San Francisco
companies. When the planning department attempted to
impose OHPP on U.S. Leasing, a San Francisco company
relocating to an office building which it intended to
renovate, the Mayor asked the planning department to
"re-evaluate" the requirement as it applied to relocating
San Francisco companies. The planning director agreed
that the requirement could be mitigated in that instance.
Marcene Henricksen, The Housing Requirement: A Case In
Point, San Francisco Bus., May 1982, at 14.
69. Memorandum from San Francisco Planning Director
Dean Macris, OHPP Guidelines 5 (Jan. 22, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as OHPP Guidelines].
70. The assumptions in the formula are primarily
based on a consultant study by Sedway Cooke for the Dep't
of City Planning in Oct. 1979 entitled Downtown San
Francisco Conservation and Development Planning Program,
Phase I Study. Memorandum from San Francisco Planning
director Dean Macris to San Francisco City Attorney George
Agnost (Mar. 2, 1982).
71. OHPP Guidelines, supra note 69, at 10.
72. Id. at 8, 10.
73. Id. at 11.
74. These funds are to be used in conjunction with
proceeds from the sale of $60,000,000 of tax exempt
mortgage revenue bonds. Id. at 13, 16. Sixty million
dollars in lower interest tax exempt bonds will be issued
at a rate of 10.75% per annum for a 30 year term. As
needed, monthly mortgage payments of low- and
middle-income homebuyers will be further reduced by the
pool of shared appreciation funds contributed by office
developers at a cost of $6,000 per unit required.
Mortgage assistance payments are available for buyers of
newly constructed homes with maximum incomes of $40,260
and for buyers of existing homes with maximum incomes of
$33,550. The assistance payments will reduce the
borrower's share of the housing expense to 33.33% of gross
family income. Memorandum from the Office of Housing and
Community Development, Citywide Affordable Bond Program
(July 6, 1982); Bulletin from lst Nationwide Savings, City
and County of San Francisco Citywide Affordable Bond
Program - How To Apply.
- 65 -
75. "Affordable" housing units are those units which
are rented or sold to low-income families (income under
80% of the median) or moderate-income families (80-120% of
the median) at a rent not exceeding 30% of their gross
monthly income or a homeownership expense not exceeding
38% of their gross monthly income. OHPP Guidelines, supra
note 69, at 7.
76. Id. at 9-10.
77. Id. at 14-16.
78. See supra note 74.
79. OHPP Guidelines, supra note 69, at 16. Cf.
Orange County, Cal., Res. No. 79-1840 (the inclusionary
housing program guidelines allow for transfer of excess
credits for affordable units). For an explanation of
Orange County's inclusionary program see Burton, supra
note 38; for an explanation of the inclusionary concept,
see infra note 105.
80. Telephone interview with Laurie Share of San
Francisco's Mayor's Office of Housing and Community
Development (Mar. 10, 1983).
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
83. Cf. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, Housing For The '70s: A Report of the
National Housing Policy Review, at 135 (1974) (Provision
of housing subsidies through the federal programs of the
early 1970s increased the quantity and quality of housing
for those few who were subsidized but decreased production
of new units for everyone else. Although the programs
resulted in a net addition to the housing stock, the net
adds were only equal to a portion of the total number
subsidized because (1) a portion of credit for subsidy
programs was bid away from unsubsidized buyers, and (2)
the subsidies were financed by increased taxes or
increased government borrowing which reduced comsumption
and investment elsewhere in the economy at the expense of
unsubsidized housing, and (3) subsidized housing was
produced inefficiently).
84 According to Laurie Share of OHCD, however, the
city's economists feel that demand so far exceeds supply
in San Francisco that it would take a massive injection of
new units into the market to affect residential
developers' building decisions. Telephone interview with
Laurie Share of OHCD (Mar. 10, 1983).
- 66 -
85. See supra text accompanying note 73.
86. Certain developers have seriously looked at San
Francisco and decided to take their projects elsewhere.
Given current high interest rates, the length and
concomitant cost of the permit process in San Francisco,
and the uncertainty associated with the outcome of the
transit impact development fee described supra note 47 it
is difficult to attribute these decisions not to locate in
San Francisco solely to OHPP. The office-housing program
can be characterized, however, as one more cost that makes
a project less profitable sooner and, therefore, does
affect location decisions.
87. The decision not to contest the imposition of
OHPP is due to the fact that each developer is so
committed to his project in terms of time and money that
he acts in his own self-interest. It appears that certain
of the developers have chosen to fight the transit impact
development fee described supra note 47 but to comply with
OHPP.
88. Interviews with John Harris of Norland
Properties in San Francisco (June 10, 1982) and Jim
Schaffer of Lincoln Properties in San Francisco (July 7,
1982).
89. Interview with John Harris of Norland Properties
in San Francisco (June 10, 1982).
90. Interview with Dick Morton of the San Francisco
Chamber of Commerce (July 7, 1982); see also Kilduff,
supra note 49 at 169.
91. The first three office developers upon whom the
city levied OHPP requirements agreed to comply for various
reasons, including relatively innocuous initial
requirements, stiff penalties for finishing behind
schedule, and fairly inexpensive methods of fulfilling the
requirement.
92. Office developers have labe-led OHPP as "ransom"
but appear to abide by the rules of the game of the city
in which they choose to develop their projects. Kilduff,
supra note 49, at 169.
93. Cf. Hack and Ginoza, Private and Public
Responsibilities in Housing Site Development (July 1,
1982) (paper presented at a conference sponsored by the
Jt. Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard
University and the Lincoln Institute for Land Policy)
(subdivision developers paid $6,178 per unit for growth
impact fees in Livermore, Cal. in 1981).
- 67 -
94. Interviews with Willian Witte, Deputy Director
of OHCD in San Francisco (July 22, 1982), and John Harris
of Norland Properties in San Francisco (June 10, 1982).
95. Interview with John Harris of Norland Properties
in San Francisco (June 10, 1982).
96. Interviews with John Harris of Norland
Properties in San Franciso (June 10, 1982) and Dick Morton
of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce (July 7, 1982).
97. See supra text accompanying note 30.
98. Kilduff, supra note 49, at 169.
99. Meeting of the American Planning Association in
San Francisco (July 14, 1982) (discussing OHPP).
100. For example, the Bank of Canton is
participating in the mortgage revenue bond program. Mayor
of San Francisco's Office of Housing and Community
Development, OHPP Commitments to Housing Development (May
24, 1982).
101. Kilduff, supra note 49, at 170.
102. Interview with Jim Schaffer of Lincoln
Properties in San Francisco (July 7, 1982).
103. One office developer was in fact contemplating
investing in such a project, but has instead decided to
meet the requirement by contributing to a federally funded
Section 8 project. Telephone interview with Laurie Share
of OHCD (Mar. 10, 1983). The proposal under consideration
would have involved a partnerhip between a non-profit
group (South of Market Development Corp.) and the office
developer (Trammel Crow) to rehabilitate a residential
hotel. The office developer was to serve as limited
partner, the non-profit group was to serve as general
partner, and a tenants' organization (TODCO) was to manage
the building. The building was to be sold after twenty
years with the non-profit group and the office developer
splitting the proceeds 25%-75%. Interview with John
Elberling of TODCO in San Francisco. (July 22, 1982).
104. For example, Campeau, Norland Properties, and
Trammel Crow are all considering building residential
units in the offices. Interview with Bill Cumbelich of
Coldwell Banker (July 12, 1982).
- 68 -
105. A proposal that OHPP be used to fund only low-
and moderate-income housing is similar to the concept of
inclusionary zoning, whereby a city requires a housing
developer to set aside a set number of housing units
within the project for occupancy at reduced rates by low-
and moderate-income families. See generally Ellickson,
The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S.Cal. L. Rev.
1167 (1981); Burton, supra note 38; Taylor, Inclusionary
Zoning: A Workable Option for Affordable Housing, Urban
Land, Mar. 1981, at 6.
106. The requirement would also please housing
activists, although some of them believe that the OHPP
revenue bond fee should be set at a much higher amount,
i.e. $20,000.
107. Cal. Pub. Res. Code S 21000 et seg. (West
1977 and Supp. 1982).
108. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR) is
required to be prepared for all projects that must be
approved by public agencies. Cal. Pub. Res. Code
S 21080 (West Supp. -1982). EIRs are required for private
as well as public projects. Friends of Mammoth v. Board
of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 1, as modified, 8 Cal. 3d 247,
502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). Downtown office
buildings require EIRS because they are private projects
subject to discretionary approval by the Planning
Commission. See, e.g., San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v.
Friends of GiTIT 121 Cal. App. 3d 203, 174 Cal. Rptr. 784
(1981).
109. Cal. Pub. Res. Code SS 21002,21002.1(b) (West
Supp. 1982).
110. Cal. Pub. Res. Code S 21000(g) (West Supp.
1982) (amended by 1979 Cal. Stat. c. 947, p. 3270, S 4);
Cal. Pub. Res. Code S 21001(a) (West Supp. 1982)
(amended by 1979 Cal. Stat. c. 947, p. 3271, S 5).
111. Interview with Paul Zigman of Environmental
Science Associates in San Francisco (June 11, 1982).
112. Cal. Pub. Res. Code S 21100 (West Supp. 1982)
(amended by 1981 Cal. Stat. c. 264, p.__ § 1).
113. Cal. Environmental Quality Act, ch. 1438, Cal.
Pub. Res. Code S 21004 (Sept. 27, 1982).
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114. San Francisco, Cal., Municipal Code, Part 3,
S 26. The city planning commission approved Resolution
No. 8474 on Jan. 17, 1983, establishing a policy that any
downtown building permit application would be reviewed by
the Planning Commission under this discretionary power.
Such topics of review could include the protection and
enhancement of the pedestrian environment, preservation of
architecturally and historically significant buildings or
of housing, avoidance of industrial displacement, adequate
transportation, energy conservation, and the effect of
development on the skyline and on views from public areas.
115. San Francisco, Cal, Planning Commission Res.
8474 (Jan. 17, 1980).
116. "A county or city may make and enforce within
its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general
laws." Cal. Const. art. 11, S 7 (West Supp. 1982).
See, e.g., Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d
656, 662, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 677 (1980) .
117. Cal. Const. art. 11, S 5 (West Supp. 1982);
see generally Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60
Calif. L. Rev. 1055 (1972).
118. The ordinance also must not violate the state
and federal constitutions. Sandalow, The Limits of
Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts,
48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 665, 665 n.8 (1964).
119. See Senate Bill 2011, Legislative Counsel's
Digest, 91 130, Sept. 1982 explaining supra note 113.
120. Cal. Gov't Code SS 65580 (West Supp. 1982).
121. Id. at S 65700.
122. Id. at S 65580(b).
123. Id. at S 65583(c) (2).
124. Id. at S 65584(a).
125. Id. at S 65581(c).
126. See id. at S 65580(c) ("The provision of
housing affrdaIe to low- and moderate-income households
requires the cooperation of all levels of government");
see also id. at S 65580(e) ("[E]ach local government also
has the responsibility . . . to cooperate with other local
governments and the state in addressing regional housing
needs").
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127. If there is a conflict between state law and
local law on a specific issue, local law prevails only if
the issue involves a purely municipal affair. See
generally Sato, supra note 117.
128. Cal. Gov't Code S 65587.1(b) (West Supp.
1983).
129. Compare Cal. Gov't Code S 65913.1 (West Supp.
1982) ("In exercising its authority to zone for land uses,
a city. . .shall designate and zone sufficient vacant land
for residential use with appropriate standards, in
relation to zoning for nonresidential use, and in relation
to growth projections of the general plan to meet housing
needs as identified in the general plan . . . .").
130. The California courts tend to use the same
method of analysis when examining a land use restriction
challenged under both the state and federal
constitutions. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266; Associated Homebuilders v. Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 633 (1970); Southern Pacific v. City of Los
Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966),
appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 647, Miller v. Board of Public
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Ps 381 (1925).
131. See generally R. Ellickson & A. Tarlock,
Land-Use Controls 63 (1981) [hereinafter cited as R.
Ellickson].
132. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 428 U.S. 1,
15 (1976).
133. See, e.g., U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-177 n.10 (1980); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-125 (1978); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-304 (1976); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483, 487-488 (1955).
134. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
135. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. at 387.
136. Id. at 288.
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137. "The California Courts have long been
exceedingly deferential to land-use controls adopted by
local governments . . . . The California approach is
consistent with the Supreme Court's most recent reading of
the Constitution, which the Court now construes to impose
only minimal constraints on the enactment of 'social and
economic' legislation." R. Ellickson, supra note 131,
at 75; see, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1920); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 41 (1976); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.
2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949); Miller v. Board of Public
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
138. The distinction between means and ends is often
used to analyze substantive due process and equal
protection cases. "Does the challenged law (understood as
a means to an end) achieve its objective; and is that
objective, if achieved, legitimate?" Perry, Substantive
Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417, 422 (1976)
139. Alternatively, San Francisco could characterize
the objectives of the program as (1) decreasing traffic
congestion and (2) improving air quality and saving energy
by decreasing commuting time. Task Force Report, supra
note 9, at 7; Lefcoe, When Governments Become Land
Developers, supra note 10, at 198. The city could then
argue that transportation and environmental quality were
legitimate government functions.
140. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. at 395.
141. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
(Congressional determination that renovation of the
District of Columbia was in the public interest justified
free exercise of eminent domain power by agency).
142. Id. at 32.
143. Id. at 33.
144. Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Dockweiler,
14 Cal. 2d 437, 449-450, 94 P.2d 794 (1939).
145. Keyes v. United States, 119 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir.
1941) cert. denied 314 U.S. 636 (1941).
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146. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 34.
147. Chelcy v. Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority,
24 Misc.2d 598, 206 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1960); Cremer v. Peoria
Housing Authority, 399 Ill. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948); San
Francisco City Att'y Opinion No. 64-30 (Dec. 31, 1964);
see Middle Class Gets Help With Housing, N.Y. Times, Dec.
5, 1982, at 46, col. 1. But see Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency v. New England Merchants National Bank of
Boston, 356 Mass. 202, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969)(provision of
moderate-income housing upheld only because incidental to
provision of low-income housing); see also Martin v. North
Carolina Housing Corporation, 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665
(1970)(loans made by state agency to developers only
constitutional if used to supply low-income housing).
148. In Note, State Economic Substantive Due
Process, 88 Yale L.J. 1487, 1501-2 (1979), the author
proposes that courts examining issues of substantive due
process employ an analysis based on the functional
categorization of state ends traditionally used by
economists: allocation, stabilization, and
redistribution. Using OHPP funds to produce low- and
moderate-income housing could serve a legitimate end under
this proposed analysis because it could be characterized
as (1) an allocative measure that attempts to correct
housing market failures; (2) a stabilization measure that
attempts to prevent massive increases in housing price
during a period of housing shortage; and (3) a
redistributive measure that attempts to transfer wealth
from the rich to the poor.
149. Cal. Health & Safety Code S 50003 (West Supp.
1982); see also Burton, supra note 38, at 33.
150. Cal. Gov't Code S 65915 (West Supp. 1982).
151. Cal. Gov't Code S 65580(b) (West Supp. 1982).
The federal government also promotes housing for upper
income households by allowing homeowners to deduct
interest payments from their federal taxes. Internal
Revenue Code S 163.
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152. See, e.g., New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency
v. McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 420, 267 A.2d 24, 27 (1970)
("[Tihe Legislature made a determination that there was a
critical shortage of adequate housing"); Martin v. North
Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 44 ("[T]here exists a
serious shortage of decent, safe and sanitary residential
housing available at low prices or rentals to persons of
lower income"); Chelcy v. Buffalo Municipal Housing
Authority, 24 Misc.2d 598 ("[B]uffalonians are leaving the
city and it is reasonable to assume that inadequate
housing is one of the substantial causes"); Cremer v.
Peoria Housing Authority, 399 Ill. 579, 589 ("[W]e take
judicial notice of the obvious and pressing need for more
housing - and, further, the record fully affirms the
existence of a critical housing shortage").
153. Cf. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. The City
of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (a city
can condemn property in a viable functioning neighbouhood
and transfer it to a private corporation to build a plant
to promote industry and commerce adding new jobs and taxes
to the economic base of the community).
154. "As time passes, any individual housing unit
tends to filter downward in relative quality as its
components depreciate, and as its layout and equipment
become obsolete . . . .The infusion of new housing units
into a regional market sets off a chain of moves that
eventually tends to increase vacancy rates (or reduce
prices) in the housing stock within the means of low- and
moderate-income families." Ellickson, The Irony of
"Inclusionary" Zoning, supra note 105, at 1185. For a
more detailed discussion of the definition of filtering
and the mechanics of the filtering process see W.
Grigsby, Housing Markets and Public Policy 84-130 (1963);
see also J. Lansing, C. Clifton & J. Morgan, New Homes
and Poor People 3 (1969) ("Two approaches to the analysis
of filtering have been distinguished. In one approach,
the focus is on the dwelling unit and on analysis of its
history. Thus, a particular dwelling unit may be said to
filter down over the years as it gets older and its market
value or price falls. In the second approach the focus is
on people, and how people of successively lower economic
position obtain dwellings. Following the first approach,
filtering may be defined in terms of a change in the
selling price (or rent) of the dwelling unit, measured in
constant dollars; or it may be defined in terms of changes
in the rank order of the dwelling unit among all dwelling
- 74 -
units when ranked by quality. Following the second, it
may be defined in terms of the income level in absolute
terms of the people who live in the dwelling, or their
rank position among all income receiving units. Thus, a
dwelling which at one time was occupied by a family in the
top tenth of the income distribution may, after a long
history, be the home of a family in the bottom tenth.").
155. For a study that concludes that filtering
works, at least for the low-income white population, see
J. Lansing, supra note 154, at 68.
156. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 115.
157. Id. at 116; see also Achtenberg, Social Utility
of Rent Control, Housing Urban America 443 (ed. Pynoos,
Schafer, Hartman, 1973) ("Without subsidies, new housing
costs are far beyond what [low and moderate income] groups
can afford, and in periods of excess demand such housing
is more likely to filter "up" than "down"the income
scale.).
158. N. Marcus & M. Groves, The New Zoning: Legal,
Administrative, and Economic Concepts and Techniques 45
(1970); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 ("Once
the object is within the authority of Congress, the means
by which it will be attained is also for Congress to
determine.").
159. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los
Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); see generally
Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
Through subdivision Exactions, 73 Yale L. J. 1119,
(1964); Marcus, A Comparative Look at TDR, Subdivision
Exactions, and Zoning as Environmental Preservation
Panaceas: The Search for Dr. Jekyll without Mr. Hyde, 20
Urb. L.J. 3, 20-27 (1980); Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J.
385 (1977).
160. Southern Pacific Company v. City of Los
Angeles, 242 Cal.App.2d 38, 51 Cal.Rptr. 197 (1966),
appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 647.
161. Bringle v. Board of Supervisors of County of
Orange, 54 Cal.2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal.Rptr. 493 (1960).
162. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275
Cal.App.2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
163. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mt.
Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 797 (1961).
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164. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.
2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S.
4 (1966); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d
78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Ayres v. City
Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31.
165. 275 Cal.App.2d at 421.
166. 34 Cal.2d 31 (1949).
167. Id. at 41.
168. 4 Cal.3d 633.
169. Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code S 11546, now Cal.
Gov't Code S 66477 (West Supp. 1982).
170. 4 Cal. 3d at 639-640.
171. Id. at 638.
172. Id. at 640 n.6.
173. The city is assuming that office developers
will pass the cost of the OHPP contribution forward to the
tenants - the parties who are actually increasing housing
demand in San Francisco. Meeting of the American Planning
Association in San Francisco (July 14, 1982) (discussing
OHPP). But see Ellickson, supra note 105, at 1187-1191
(the incidence-of an inclusionary tax depends on the
perceived uniqueness of the city and the tax may, under
varying circumstances, be passed back to the landowner,
borne by the developer, or passed on to the consumer).
174. If the city characterizes the objectives of the
program not as providing housing but as decreasing
traffic, saving energy, and reducing air pollution, it can
meet the nexus test by demonstrating that suburban
residents who commute downtown increase traffic
congestion, pollution, and energy consumption. San
Francisco can use OHPP to balance the growth of jobs and
housing, and meet objectives by housing people close to
their work place. See supra note 139.
175. Associated Homebuilders, 4 Cal. 3d 633.
176. Id.
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177. In fact, under the rationale of Norsco
Enterprises v. City of Fremont, 54 Cal.App.3d 488, 126
Cal.Rptr. 659 (1976), the city may even be able to impose
the OHPP housing contribution requirement on companies
that are merely relocating to new offices in San Francisco
and are not necessarily bringing new workers to the city.
See supra note 68. The Norsco court allowed the
municipality to levy in-lieu recreation fees on the owner
of an apartment building who had filed for approval of a
subdivision map for conversion of his building to
condominiums. Even though the conversion did not add new
residents to the community or otherwise increase the
city's need for recreation facilities, the court allowed
the city to impose the requirement, reasoning that the
statute was based on the general public need for
recreation facilities caused by existing and future
subdivisions.
178. Task Force Report, supra note 9 at 60-64.
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying note 172.
181. See Task Force Report, supra note 9 at 204.
182. Liberty II v. California Coastal Com'n, 113
Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980).
183. Id. at 502.
184. 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
185. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Nectow v. Cambridge, 227 U.S. 187 (1928);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). The leading
case for the proposition that a statute may so frustrate
investment-backed expectations as to result in a taking is
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In
situations where the regulation does severely disturb
investment-backed expectations the law is currently in a
state of flux as to whether what has occured is a taking
which would give rise to an action for inverse
condemnation, see San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting),
or an excessive use of the police power which would result
in invalidation of the regulation. In Agins v. City of
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Tiberon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372
(1979), affirmed, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the court held that
a zoning ordinance may be unconstitutional and subject to
invalidation only when its effect is to deprive the
landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his
property; see also Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New
york, 39 NiTY 2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1976).
186. Penn Central v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at
131.
187. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (75%
diminution in value not a taking); Hadachek v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (87.5% diminution in value not a taking).
189. The Supreme Court recently held in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 5 U.S.L.W. 4988 (June
30, 1982), that if the regulation involves an actual
physical taking, then character is no longer just a factor
but is determinative of a taking.
190. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (forced
maintenance of exterior features of landmarks).
191. Norsco Enterprises v. City of Fremont, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 488, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976). See also Estate
of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 75, 485 P.2d 785, 95 Cal. Rptr.
433, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015.
192. Lindsey v. Normat, 405 U.S. 56, 73 (1972).
193. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 127.
194. See supra note 46; Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City
and County of San Francisco, No. 786-779, at 23-24,
(Superior Court of the State of Cal. for the City and
County of San Francisco) (Jan. 18, 1982) (Memorandum of
points and authorities in opposition to complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief) (legality of one-to-one
residential conversion requirements).
195. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929);
Werner v. Southern Cal. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 132,
216 P.2d 825) (1950), quoted in, Norsco Enterprises, 54
Cal. App. 3d at 497.
196. 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976).
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197. See Westfield-Palos Verdes Company v. City of
Rancho Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d 486, 141 Cal. Rptr.
36 (1977) (an environmental excise tax imposed by the city
did not unreasonably discriminate against residential
developers, even though they were taxed at a higher rate
than were contractors). The distinction the court found
in this case was that developers plan entire subdivisions,
while contractors produce individual custom-designed homes.
198. Board of Education v. Watson, 63 Cal. 2d 829,
833, 409 P.2d 481, 48 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1966), quoted in
Norsco Enterprises 54 Cal. App. 3d at 498.
199. Proposition 13, which appeared on the June 6,
1978 ballot in California is also known as the Jarvis-Gann
initiative.
200. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v.
Farrel, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713,
(1982) (payroll and gross receipt taxes); Trent Meredith,
Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 685 (1981) (school facility fees and in-lieu
dedication requirements); Albert Mills v. County of
Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 164 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1980)
(fee for county services in processing subdivision, zoning
and land-use applications); County of Fresno v. Malmstrom,
94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979) (special
assessments); 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 831 (1979) (charges
imposed in a county service area); 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
673 (1979) (in-lieu fee imposed as a condition on issuance
of building permit for construction of low- and
moderate-income housing); 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 663
(1979) (subdivision fees for defraying the cost of
constructing bridges, railways, freeways, canyons and
thoroughfares); 62 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen 254 (1979)
(subdivision school fees).
201. "Cities, counties, and special districts, by a
two-thirds vote of the qualified voters of such district,
may impose special taxes on such district, except ad
valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or
sales tax on the sale of real property within such city,
county, or special district." Cal. Const., Art. XIIIA,
S 4.
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202. Farrel, 32 Cal. 3d 47. The court held that a
payroll and gross receipts tax was not a S 4 special tax,
construing special taxes to mean taxes which are levied
for a specific purpose rather than a levy placed in the
general fund to be utilized for general government
purposes. While this definition might seem to
characterize OHPP as a special tax, the court explicitly
stated that it was considering the applicability of S 4 to
taxes for general revenues and not to fees for services
provided.
203. 114 Cal. App. 3d 317.
204. 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 673 (1979).
205. 114 Cal. App. 3d at 324 ("A reading of the
Attorney General's opinions leads us to conclude that the
definition is overly broad. It fails to consider the
regulatory nature of fees, upon whom the fee is imposed
and the purpose of the fee".).
206. See, e.g., Farrel, 32 Cal. 3d 47; Trent
Meredith, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317; Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d
974.
207. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 128, 149 Cal. Rptr.
239 (1978).
208. 22 Cal. 3d at 231.
209. Cf. Los Angeles County Transportation
Commission v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197 (1982) ("Since only
those'special districts' which levied property taxes would
'replace' the 'loss' of such taxes, these statements imply
that the 'special districts' referred to are those which
are authorized to levy a property tax.").
210. Mills, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 660.
211. See, e.g., Malnstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974
(special assessments are not special taxes); Mills, 108
Cal. App. 3d 656, 660 (the court stated that it did not
believe that the voters intended that fees for
governmental activities conferring a direct benefit on the
specific individual who is charged for hospital services,
public transportation, and garbage collection would
require the two-thirds stamp of approval).
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212. The Attorney-General opinions reflect a more
stringent attitude in measuring fees and exactions against
the purposes of S 4. The Attorney-General seems to exempt
from S 4 only those fees whose purpose "is-not to raise
revenue for the benefit of the governmental agency as
distinguished from the persons or property from whom or
which it is exacted". 62 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen 663, 667.
Hence, the Attorney-General finds that special assessments
are not special taxes, for they are for the benefit of the
assessed property and are therefore not a mechanism for
circumventing S 1 and S 2 of Art. XIIIA. 62 Op. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 663. He also finds that "fees . . . which
compensate a public agency for its cost of rendering a
particular service to citizens and exacted from recipients
of that service are not taxes and would not run counter to
the objectives of Art. XIIIA." 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
831, 838. He states, however, that "charges for services
that are exacted from all or a portion of taxpayers
irrespective of whether the services are used by or
rendered to the taxpayers" would constitute special
taxes. Id.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 168-172.
214. 114 Cal.App.3d 317, 327.
215. 108 Cal. App. 3d at 661-662.
216. Id. at 663. See also Cal. Gov't Code S 50076
(West Supp. 1982) ("special tax shall not include any fee
which does not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the
service or regulatory activity for which the fee is
charged and which is not levied for general revenue
purposes."). But see 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 673. The
Attorney General decided that an in-lieu participation fee
on residential developers for low- and moderate-income
housing was a special tax: "although it is part of a
regulatory scheme, the primary purposes and effect is to
raise revenue." Id. at 679. Perhaps the Attorney
General's opinion can be distinguished from OHPP on the
basis of the rational nexus test. OHPP provides a more
direct benefit to new tenants of office buildings in the
form of increased housing opportunities than a housing fee
provides to subdivision residents who already have a place
to live.
217. Research may indicate, for example, that more
units will actually be produced if the developers' OHPP
contribution is concentrated in a smaller number of units
at an investment of greater than $6,000 per unit than if
the money is spread over a larger number of units at a
cost of only $6,000 per unit.
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218. Farrel, 32 Cal. 3d -47. Resolution of the
validity of the transit impact development fee, described
supra note 47, may well bear on the determination of
whether OHPP is a tax or a fee.
219. The city can retain a certain amount of
flexibility by inserting a safety valve into the ordinance
for hardship cases. Although the clause might be viewed
as a loophole, the courts might see the program as more
reasonable if it contains provision for exceptional
cases. It would then be the city's duty to ensure that
the exception did not swallow the rule. San Francisco is
currently considering placing OHPP in an ordinance based
on its ability to designate certain uses conditional
uses. Conditional use zoning is based on the premise that
while conditional uses are essentially desirable,
necessary or convenient they present special problems
which cannot be solved by restrictions of general
application to all permitted uses. A. Rathkopf, Law of
Zoning and Planning, Vol 3 S 41.01 (4th ed.) This
approach may prove suitable but this paper does not
discuss the implications of using conditional use zoning
to implement OHPP.
220. Interview with William Witte, Deputy Director
of OHCD, and Dean Macris, Planning Director, in San
Francisco (July 21, 1982).
221. J. Barnett, Urban Design and Public Policy 38
(1974) (new and stringent regulations have a high
incidence of defeat in legislatures).
222. The original incentive zoning system programs
started in New York when the city offered to increase the
permissible height and bulk in buildings if developers
agreed to provide amenities such as plazas, arcades and,
later on, legitimate theaters and retail space. See
Kayden, Incentive Zoning in New York City; A Cost-Benefit
Analysis (Land Policy Roundtable Policy Analysis Series
number 201, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy ) (1978);
Whyte, What Price Sunlight? Designingl a Livable Midtown,
New York, Mar. 9, 1981, at 24-25; Peck, Living Over the
Museum: Mixed Use Cultural Projects (Conference on tHe
Economic Impact of the Arts, Graduate School of Business
and Public Administration, Cornell University May 27-28,
1981).
223. John Costonis argues that incentive zoning
recognizes that development options are a product of bulk,
use, and height regulations imposed by local governments;
urban space, he argues, should not be regarded as private
property but as a public asset which cities may property
allocate through incentive zoning to achieve community
goals. J. Costonis, Space Adrift, 38 (1974).
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224. C. Page & P. Cuff, Negotiating for Amenities
10 (1982) (published by Partners for Livable Places).
225. Telephone interview with Bruce McCormick,
planner and zoning specialist at the Toronto Planning and
Development Department (Nov. 26, 1982).
226. Burton, supra note 38.
227. Whyte, supra note 222. The developer also often
ends up with a potential windfall under an incentive
zoning system. J. Kayden, Innovative Implementation
Techniques for Downtown Washington (1981), discussed in
Page and Cuff, supra note 224.
228. Whyte, supra note 222.
229. C. Page & P. Cuff, supra note 224 at 11-12;
Ellickson, supra note 105 at 1213-1214.
230. C. Page & P. Cuff, supra note 224, at 11.
231. A sunset provision requiring termination of the
program unless extended by a vote is a built-in mechanism
for further deliberation of the merits of the program.
The city is considering another alternative, however, for
coping with this problem of adjusting the program to
swings in the economy. Its proposal entails amending the
City Planning Code to enact S 313 entitled Special
Development Requirements. The purpose of the new
ordinance would be to approve the grant of discretionary
review power to the planning commission without actually
specifying the details of any particular program such as
OHPP. The planning commission would be granted the power
to establish special development requirements which could
apply to any development proposal for which a building
permit application is required to be filed with the
Department of City Planning. The rationale of this
approach is that the planning commission would then be
able to use its discretion to not impose requirements such
as OHPP in periods of economic downturn. Telephone
interview with William Witte of OHCD (Feb. 24, 1983);
Poposed Amendment to the City Planning Code S 313
establishing Special Development Requirements, (Draft,
Mar. 8, 1983). It would seem, however, that this proposed
approach would impose no constraints on a planning
commission that chose to exact very stringent building
conditions from developers or chose to exact no conditions
at all.
232. Whyte, supra note 222.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 102-103.
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234. The establishment of a separate fund would
ensure that OHPP contributions would not wend their way
into general revenues, violating the intent of the
exaction and leaving it open to a possible attack as a
"special tax" under Proposition 13. See text accompanying
notes 216-218.
235. An example of the sort of innovative approach
that should be encouraged is the formation of a
partnership for the rehabiliation of a residential hotel
where the office developer served as limited partner and
the non-profit group served as general partner. See supra
note 103.
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237. See generally Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980); see also J.
Barnett, supra note 221 at 35.
238. Lefcoe, When Governments Become Land
Developers, supra note 10. In a case study on the
Netherlands an alifornia, Lefcoe concluded that, if
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United States, it will not be because of a socialist
ideological commitment to public ownership of all natural
monopolies. The motivation would be more pragmatic:
cities do what they must to avoid immediate crises.
Rather than simply telling property owners what they
cannot do and giving them little incentive to do what they
might, governmental bodies need an affirmative tool to
help achieve planning goals. Since World War II, the
government in The Netherlands has been subsidizing housing
for all but the wealthiest by building social housing or
by assisting non-profit organizations to do the necessary
work. By acting as land developer, the local government
can reserve sites for social housing while subsidizing the
costs of these sites out of sales of land to private
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239. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 12.
240. See Lefcoe, When Governments Become Land
Developers, supra note 10, at 205.
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APPENDIX A
OlIPP COMMITMENTS TO HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS REVISED DATE: recrudry I, ju.)
HOUSING PROJECT MOUSING CREDITS
DATE OF PRELIMI- FINAL NO.
O F C DE E P RNM________HO 
S N TYNU B R C SCITY COMMIT- NARY CREDITS CREDITS iOUSIIm
OF I E DEVELOPER NAME SPONSOR/DEVELOPER IOUSINIG TYPE NUMBER COST MENT APPROVED APPROVED UNITS
Cahill Construction
field (Calif. Jones
Highfield Holdings,
Norland Properties and
Daon Corporation
Marathon U.S. Realty
Norland Properties
1San Francisco Federal
Savings & Loan Association
Trinity Properties
Gerald Hines Interests
Grosvenor Properties
Milton Meyer & Co.
Bank of Canton
Gerald Hines Interests
Cit i corp
* UNKNOWN BECAUSE PROJECT
Pink Palace Yerba
Buena Plaza Annex
Scattered site pub-
lic housing rehab.
Northridge Coop.
Homes, Bayview
Hunters Point
Ocean Beach Assoc.
. Sec. 8 new cons-
truction
. Parcel 4 Dev.
Lassen Apartments
441 Ellis Street
Sec. 8 sub. rehab.
Scattered site new
construction
308 Eddy Street
Herald Hotel
Post/Van Ness Hsg.
McAllister Towers
100 McAllister St.
Citywide Affordable
Housing Program
Citywide Affordab
Housing Program
le
ARE IN PLANNING STA
S.F. Housing Authority
S.F. Housing Authority
All Hallow Com.'Dev.
S. F. Redev. Agency
Corp,
Ocean Beach Assoc.
Ocean Beach Assoc. &
Daon Corp.
A.F. Evans & Co. and
Asian, Inc.
-0
Trinity Properties
Hagan Family Trust
Grosvenor Properties
Hastings College of the
Law
City of San Francisco
;E OF DEVELOPMENT
NUMBER
IN SHARI
TIONS
low income public
housing rehab.
low income, public
housing rehab.
low/moderate income
family Sec. 8 new
construct ion
new low/moderate
income elderly Sec. 8
----------------------
new market-rate
low/moderate income
elderly Sec. 8 subs-
tantial rehab.
new market-rate
low/moderate income
elderly Sec. 8 rehab.
new market-rate
low/mederate income
student housing
low/moderate/middle
income new cons-
truct ion
F PERSONS RESIDING
D LIVING ACCOMMODA-
SUB-TOTAL.
610
450
707
170
*
162
*
146
564
155
1117
512
3,623
$2,440,000
1,'014,000
3,500,000
500,000
*
621,000
*
588,000
*
3,228,000
933,000
882,000
3,072.000
$16,778,000
1/82
10/81
1/82
10/82
4/82
8/82
2/82
6/82
7/82
8/82
11/82
11/82
11/82
x
x
x
11/82
11/82
11/82
X
X
X
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
305
450
301
85
*
81
*
73
282
600-65C
2177
S High-
Co. /
Inc.)
I
11
OHiPP C041TMENTS TO HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS
HOUSING PROJECT
OFFICE DEVELOPER
Vintage Properties/
(Spear Street investors)
Lincoln Properties/
(Lincoln,Mi ss ion-Speer
Associates, Ltd.)
Co Firehouse If
c3' (Seaton Corporation)
Crow-Spieker #99/
(Trammel Crow Co.
Crow-Spieker #99
(Trammel Crow Co.)
Amerisport international
*UNKNOWN BECAUSE PRO
**TOTAL DEVELOPMENT
***UNVNOWN BECAUSE I
NAME SPONSOR/DEVELOPER HOUS ING TYPE
1: ________________________ ________________________________ _________________________ I
Carter Street
Condominiums
Silverview Terraces
Bayview Hunters
Point
Chestnut Court
950 Columbus Ave.
Aspen Tenderloin Apts
249 Eddy, 165 Turk
655 Montgomery St.
Federal Hotel
1087 Market Street
JECTS ARE IN PLANNING
SIZE- 141 UNITS OF
ROJECTS WERE DEVELOP4
A.F. Evans Company
Hofiliann
Inc.
Construction Co.
Seaton Corporat ion
Housing Supervisors, Inc.
Aspen Group West, Inc.
Crow-Spieker #99
Amerisport international
STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT
ItCH 60 WILL BECOME MODERAT
D BY THE OFFICE DEVELOPER
Moderate Income
Market rate
Moderate income
Market rate
Market rate
Low/moderate
Section 8 Subst.
rehab.
Market rate
Low/moderate
SUB TOTAL
TOTAL
REVISED DATE: Feoruary 1, Uifj
HOUSING CREDITS
DATE OF PRELIMI- FINAL
CITY COMMIT- NARY CREDITS CREDITSNUMBER COST MENT APPROVED APPROVED
*
180
36
164
65
116
561
4184
700,000
500,000
820,000
$2,020,000
18,798,000
INCOME THROUGH THE OPP
1/83
1/83
10/82
12/82
12/82
10/82
x
x
x
x
N4..
tious 114t
UNITS
228t
60**
0
82 .
CD
33
39
460
2637
I
